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INFORMATION ABOUT INDIVIDUALS IN THE HANDS OF
GOVERNMENT: SOME REFLECTIONS ON MECHANISMS
FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
Lillian R. BeVier*
Information is the handmaiden of the modern activist state. In particular,
information provided by individuals to government enables government to assess
and collect taxes, to distribute social welfare benefits, and to pursue its regulatory
agenda. Computer technology enhances the government's ability to gather, store,
analyze, and process personal data. Computers make it easy for government agen-
cies to share with one another information provided to them by individual citizens.
These facts bring issues of "informational privacy" to the fore. In this Article,
Professor BeVier examines one such issue, namely that of unconsented-to use by
government of accurate information provided by citizens about themselves. Profes-
sor BeVier frames the issue in part as a problem in the control of information but
primarily as a problem in the control of government. Neither the Privacy Act of
1974 nor the Computer Matching Act of 1988 nor the privacy exemptions of the
Freedom of Information Act effectively constrain unconsented-to use or disclosure
of personal data by federal agencies. Nor, she concludes, would the Data Protec-
tion Board advocated by most other commentators represent a genuine solution.
The subject of this Article is identifiable personal data that individuals
have supplied to government. The Article's focus will be on the legal and
institutional mechanisms that presently protect the privacy of such data. In
light of those mechanisms, the Article will inquire whether it is or should be
true that information obtained from citizens by the government for one
purpose should not be used for another purpose without the consent of the
individual.
Information supplied by citizens to government is the indispensable
handmaiden of the modern activist state. Consider for a moment the num-
' Henry and Grace Charitable Foundation Professor of Law and Elizabeth D. and
Richard R. Merrill Research Professor, University of Virginia Law School. I thank
University of Virginia Law students Timothy Lawrie '96, and Jeffrey Doctoroff '97, for
their able research assistance. Thanks also to my colleagues Richard Merrill and George
Cohen for their helpful comments on an early draft; to the very knowledgeable partici-
pants in the Marshall-Wythe School of Law Symposium, Access vs. Privacy, held in
March 1995, and to faculty colleagues at a University of Virginia summer round table
discussion for helpful comments.
One commentator has gone so far as to claim:
Government is information. Its employees are nearly all information workers, its
raw material is information inputs, its product is those inputs transformed into
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ber, scope, and range of the government's activities, and recognize that
essential informational corollaries exist for the efficient conduct of each. A
full accounting of the occasions in which government, in legitimate-that is
to say, constitutionally permitted-pursuit of one or another of its substan-
tive ends, requires citizens to supply it with information about themselves
would be pointlessly tedious and unmanageably long. A broad-brush re-
minder of some of government's most familiar and salient informational
demands, however, will help the reader appreciate why the uses that govern-
ment makes of the personal information that its citizens supply is a perva-
sive and significant issue.
The government collects revenue. In part because the Internal Revenue
Code has become such a complex maze of deductions, exemptions, sur-
charges, and credits, citizens cannot pay taxes without at the same time
providing the government with quite detailed information about their fami-
lies, jobs, investments, misfortunes, and favorite charities.
The government spends the revenue it collects (and then some!). Among
the many projects on which it spends money, the government administers a'
hugely complicated array of social welfare programs designed to benefit
citizens who have a multitude of different needs. It subsidizes home mort-
gages and insures bank deposits. It supports medical research and contrib-
utes funds to provide medical care for elderly and indigent persons. It sup-
plies funds for education, from Head Start programs to graduate student
loans. It funds Aid to Families with Dependent Children and gives aid to
veterans. It supplements the incomes of those who are poor, blind, aged, and
disabled. If government is to achieve the redistributive purposes that these
spending programs have been designed to accomplish, it must be able to
require that benefit applicants provide it with truthful and appropriately
detailed information about their circumstances, the occasion and nature of
their needs, and their eligibility for assistance.
Government regulates practically every corner of our lives, including, to
mention but a few: our employment practices; the safety of our worksites
and their accessibility to disabled persons; the contents and effectiveness of
the foods, drugs, and pesticides we market; the design of the airplanes, cars,
buses, trains, and bicycles we ride; and the behavior of issuers of financial
instruments in markets for publicly-traded securities. The government cannot
fulfill its regulatory mission unless those who are subject to the regulations
provide regulators with truthful and relevant information that will enable
them to monitor the activities of the regulated entities for compliance.
policies, which are simply an authoritative form of information. So in a narrow
sense, to consider government information policy is not far from considering the
essence of government itself.
Harlan Cleveland, Government Is Information (But Not Vice Versa), 46 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 605, 605 (1986).
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The fact that the government collects such great quantities of data gives
rise to concern in many corners that the data will be inappropriately dissem-
inated, within government or to outsiders, or that it will be otherwise mis-
used or abused. Recent advances in computer technology, which permit data
to be manipulated, organized, compiled, transferred, distributed, and re-
trieved with hitherto unimaginable ease, exacerbate such concern.
This Article addresses an aspect of that concern, namely the question of
what government does with individually identifiable information it collects
from individuals about themselves. Though I acknowledge that a great deal
of valuable proprietary business information-from trade secrets,2 pesticide
formulae,3 employment practices,4 airplane designs,5 and the like-must be
supplied to the government so that it can carry on its regulatory mission,
and that guarding the confidentiality of this information poses a significant
challenge of its own, this Article does not address that problem. Instead it
follows the convention that has developed in the privacy literature and con-
fines its inquiry to what that literature implicitly (and correctly) regards as
the analytically separate question of how-and whether-to guard personal
data. This Article describes and evaluates the most significant legal and in-
stitutional mechanisms that presently exist to protect identifiable personal
data about individuals that the government has collected from them. It con-
siders whether individuals have meaningfully enforceable rights, or even
legitimately entertained expectations, of being able to control the use or
dissemination-within the government itself or to outsiders-of personal
information from or about them that the government has collected from
them in pursuit of one facet or another of its vast and multifarious substan-
tive mission.
Because privacy is so large and complex a topic, and because the legal
and institutional mechanisms for protecting private information in
government's hands are somewhat diffuse, a few words are in order to limit
the scope and agenda of this Article. In that it proposes to consider certain
questions rather than setting itself the task of definitively answering them,
this Article's agenda is relatively, modest. This Article will paint a compli-
cated legal landscape with a broad brush, hopefully avoiding inaccuracies
but deliberately omitting a myriad of detail. Rather than offering a detailed
summary of a comprehensive research project, this Article offers what I
believe is at least a provocative perspective,' aiming to identify some im-
2 See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
6 In fact, this Article is a preliminary part of a comprehensive study, Privacy in
Telecommunications, that I am undertaking for the American Enterprise Institute. In the
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portant issues that the privacy community has sometimes tended to neglect,
and to cast a different light on some familiar themes.
Any discussion that purports to be about "privacy" must begin by defin-
ing how it proposes to use the term. Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used
denotatively to designate a range of wildly disparate interests-from confi-
dentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy--and
connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being
asserted in its name. For example, more than a hundred years ago, in their
classic article, Warren and Brandeis advocated protection for a "right to be
let alone."' Seventy years later, in an influential synthesis of common law
developments to date, Dean Prosser discovered that under the rubric of the
"right of privacy," common law courts had protected plaintiffs from four
quite distinct kinds of injuries: intrusion upon their solitude or into their pri-
vate lives, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, publicity putting
them in a false light, and appropriation of the commercial value of their
name or likeness.9
This Article is concerned with what commentators in recent years have
begun denominating as a distinct interest in "informational privacy." Free-
dom from unwanted disclosure of personal data is perhaps the most impor-
tant manifestation of the interest, but for its advocates, securing informa-
tional privacy requires more than just granting legal protection to secret-
keeping. What advocates regard as being fundamentally at stake in the claim
to informational privacy is control of personal information. 0 As Alan
Westin explained in his seminal and much-cited study, to speak of a right of
informational privacy is to invoke a "claim of individuals ... to determine
course of that more comprehensive work, I will inevitably reconsider many of the con-
clusions expressed here. In addition, I anticipate that I will substantially revise the orga-
nizational framework. Thus it would be appropriate for the reader to regard the present
analysis as provisional.
For a differing perspective on the nature of the problem involved in government
collection, use, and dissemination of personal data, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States,
80 IOWA L. REV. 533 (1995), which was published just as the present Article was going
to press, thus precluding the detailed response herein that it would have merited.
' The right to abortion was originally denominated as an aspect of a woman's right
to privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890). The article has spawned a rich literature. See, e.g., Symposium: The
Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1991).
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
10 See Marc Rotenberg, In Support of a Data Protection Board in the United States,
8 GOV'T INFO. Q. 79, 80 (1991) ("Privacy is the right of individuals to control the dis-
closure of personal information and to hold those accountable who misuse information,
breach a confidence, or who profit from the sale of information without first obtaining
the consent of the individual.").
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for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.""
This Article is not concerned with every context in which informational
privacy might be thought to be at risk. It does not address issues in the
gathering and exchange of information by actors in the private sector." Its
concern is instead limited to the individual rights to control the use and
dissemination of personally identifiable information in the hands of govern-
ment. Specifically, its focus is on the use by government of information that
individuals have disclosed to the government, or have revealed in the con-
text of an encounter directly with the government, for purposes other than
that for which they disclosed the information or for use in a context differ-
ent from that in which it was revealed. Note that in being so limited, this
Article addresses a "right of privacy" that has already been importantly
compromised, for its subject is individuals' rights with respect to informa-
tion that they have already disclosed to the government, either because the
disclosure was an inevitable byproduct of a citizen-government encounter, or
because individuals were required to reveal the information in order that the
government could pursue one or another of the items on its constitutional,
legislatively-endorsed, substantive agenda.
The inquiry does not address the Fourth and Fifth Amendment questions
of when individuals have rights to withhold information from the govern-
ment in what have come to be regarded as run-of-the-mill regulatory con-
texts. If those were the topics of this inquiry, it would be mercifully short.
As Professor William Stuntz has convincingly demonstrated, when it came
to a choice between protecting privacy by permitting citizens to resist the
government's demands for information or facilitating an active regulatory
agenda by allowing government to compel citizens to provide it with sub-
stantial amounts of information, the Supreme Court followed the prevailing
political winds and chose to facilitate the regulatory agenda. 3 Except with
respect to keeping secrets from the police, there is very little-if any-
thing-left of individuals' constitutional claims to keep facts about them-
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (emphasis added); see also
CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140 (1970) (noting that privacy is the "con-
trol we have over information about ourselves").
2 For an informative treatment of some of the legal and policy issues that remain to
be resolved with respect to informational privacy in the private sector, see Jonathan P.
Graham, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Informa-
tion, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1987). For a paradigmatic cry of alarm about the threats
that privately-held databases pose to informational privacy, see Peter Hernon, Privacy
Protection and the Increasing Vulnerability of the Public, 11 GOV'T INFO. Q. 241
(1994).
13 William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1048-60 (1995).
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selves to themselves when government asks for information for a regulatory,
revenue-collecting, or benefit-conferring purpose.'4
This Article begins where Professor Stuntz left off. It assumes that the
government did not abuse its constitutional authority nor infringe individual
rights when it collected or gathered the information. Nevertheless, it as-
sumes that~it is relevant to ask whether individuals might assert some resid-
ual right or legitimate claim to "privacy," even over information they have
already disclosed to the government. Contrary to Professor Stuntz's assertion
that "a great deal of compelled information gathering occurs in ways that
ensure that the information stays secret vis-h-vis the public" because "the
federal Privacy Act often requires as much,"'5 the government's promise
that it will not further disclose information that it has compelled citizens to
supply is neither consistently enforced nor readily enforceable. 6 Taking as
given that the government did not, in pursuing the substantive agenda that
gave rise to its need for the information, act in excess of its constitutional
power to tax, to spend money, or to regulate the activities of its citizens,
this Article's analysis proceeds on the assumption that the questions of how,
and how much-and even of what it means-to protect the privacy of indi-
vidually identifiable information in the government's hands are not of con-
stitutional dimension. 7 This assumption hardly means that the questions
"4 It has been suggested, for example, that when activity itself is constitutionally
protected, it ought perhaps to be "immune from inquiry and dissemination by the gov-
ernment." Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 132 (1991).
'5 Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1041-42.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 99-110.
'7 Not everyone believes that failing to provide constitutional protection against
disclosure by government of information it has collected from citizens is normatively
appropriate. See, e.g., Heyward C. Hosch III, Note, The Interest in Limiting the Disclo-
sure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139, 191
(1983) (arguing that because disclosure of personal information by the government can
irreparably harm an individual's right to control freely the direction of his life, such
disclosures should be subject to constitutional review pursuant to a heightened rational
basis standard of review); see also Francis S. Chlapowski, The Constitutional Protection
of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 158-60 (1991) (arguing that the individ-
ual interest in informational privacy should be recognized as a constitutionally protected
right); Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Tech-
nological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 898 (1984) (same); James J. Tomkovicz, Be-
yond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment
Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 667-70 (1985) (same).
The Supreme Court has left open at least the possibility that it might consider im-
posing a constitutional duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure. In Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977), the Court rebuffed a privacy-based constitutional challenge to a New
York statute that required "doctors to disclose to the State information about prescrip-
tions for certain drugs with a high potential for abuse, and provide[d] for the storage of
that information in a central computer file." Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). The
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can be assumed to have been fully resolved. The absence of a constitutional
command that privacy be protected is not the equivalent of a prohibition on
greater protection, because the Constitution is neither the sole means by
which government's power may be limited in privacy's name nor the sole
repository of the nation's values. Scholarly commentators are free to sug-
gest, and legislative policymakers are free to enact, further compromises of
the privacy of the information that government collects from its citizens if
they deem such compromises necessary to the achievement of more pressing
public goals. They are also free to shore up privacy's existing, rather po-
rous, legal protections if that seems to them to be the wiser course.
These realities are important to the analysis. When individuals are re-
quired to provide masses of information about themselves simply as a con-
dition of being permitted to carry on one or another facet of their lives, to
pursue their livelihood in a law-abiding way, or to receive a government
benefit to which their circumstances and the terms of the governing statute
entitle them, they have already ceded to the government an important mea-
sure of their practical capacity to control further uses of that information
(not to mention their capacity to control the particular aspect of their lives
which the information embodies). Acknowledgement of these realities-of
the pervasiveness of compelled disclosure, of the variety and ubiquity of
government programs that could not go forward without disclosure, and of
the fact that sharing of personally identifiable information among govern-
ment agencies is widespread and widely known to take place-brings the
policy issue into focus. Acknowledging these realities also suggests that the
analysis is likely to be unhelpful if it contents itself merely with trying to
specify the substance of individuals' rights to control or the scope of
government's duties to protect information. Such an analysis would be un-
helpful because, however difficult the task of defining respective rights and
Court recognized that its "cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 598-600 (footnote omitted). The
Court further recognized that the New York statute might impair both interests. Id. at
600. It held, however, that the statute did not "pose a sufficiently grievous threat to
either interest to establish a constitutional violation." Id. Acknowledging that there may
well be a "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks or other massive government files," the Court
nevertheless expressed itself satisfied that New York's statutory scheme evinced a
"proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy." Id. at 605.
Justice Stevens explicitly reserved the constitutional question that "might be presented
by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data-whether intentional or
unintentional-or by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions." Id.
at 605-06. It remains true, however, that the Court has not yet confronted such a ques-
tion, much less decided that a constitutional duty of nondisclosure exists.
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duties might be, the task of designing effective enforcement mechanisms to
protect the rights and enforce the duties is even harder. In other words, the
problem of privacy of information in government's hands ought to be seen
as only partly a problem in the control of information; the problem ought to
be seen most importantly as one in the control of government. When the
problem is recognized for what it is, its intractability becomes more readily
apparent.
The privacy issue is not customarily framed in the way this Article
proposes to frame it. Indeed, the literature on the privacy of personal infor-
mation in the hands of government tends to approach the issue as if it were
principally about individual rights and government duties, as if "informa-
tion" were a tangible item easily cabined within bureaucratic and legal
boundaries, and as if the value of privacy itself were uncontested-albeit too
often compromised. Ignoring the possible relevance of the fact that individu-
als must and do comply with demands for information about themselves
from innumerable government agencies for innumerable different purposes,
commentators frame the problem of what government does with that infor-
mation as if the problem could be made to yield to a conventional analysis
aimed at uncovering the values at stake and the threats to which they are so
constantly subjected. In other words, many commentators seem to assume
that the problem of what government does with personal information in its
possession can be "solved" if only the substance of an appropriately con-
ceived notion of privacy can somehow be "enacted" into law. 8 When these
commentators run into difficulties with this approach, as they almost always
do-when they are forced to acknowledge, for example, that the enactments
themselves have less practical impact upon either bureaucratic behavior or
government information management practices than their texts might sug-
gest-they tend almost uniformly to call for the creation of a new, indepen-
dent, federal agency: a Data or Privacy Protection Board. 9 They thus em-
brace "oversight" by one government agency of other government agencies
as a workable solution to the problems of bureaucratic intransigence that
data protection issues tend to encounter.
This Article suggests that a useful answer to the question of how to
guarantee an appropriate amount of privacy for personal information that is
legally in the hands of the government is not likely to emerge simply by
adumbrating the parameters of individuals' normatively appropriate claims
for control of the government's use and dissemination of data about them-
selves. Nor will an abstract pronouncement of the government's duties pro-
vide a genuine solution. As long ago as 1973, a Code of Fair Information
1s See, e.g., PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY at xiii (1995) (arguing that
"[flor those interested in protecting privacy, the dynamics of congressional policy-mak-
ing point to the need to rethink the importance and meaning of the value of privacy").
"9 See infra text accompanying notes 239-50.
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Practices was propounded by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. 0 Among its principles were the following:
1) There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
2) There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
3) There must be a way for an individual to prevent informa-
tion about him obtained for one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without his consent.
4) There must be a way for an individual to correct or
amend a record of identifiable information about him.
5) Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dissemi-
nating records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability for their intended use and must take reasonable
precautions to prevent misuse of the data.21
No voices have been raised in dissent to the merits of these principles, and
in fact they have been essentially "enacted" in the federal Privacy Act of
1974.22 So long as these principles are stated in the abstract and presented
as if implementing them is costless and does not require the potential sacri-
fice of other policies with which they might be in competition, such as
efficient administration of government programs or effective enforcement of
criminal laws, it is hard to imagine an argument on the merits that could be
mounted against them.23 Yet as I hope to demonstrate in the pages that
follow, it is far more complicated to assure that in practice the government
will act consistently with that which the principles require. Indeed, there is a
question as to whether society is in reality as genuinely committed to imple-
menting them as our facile agreement with their statement in principle might
suggest. And unfortunately, on careful examination, the concept of a Data
Protection Board as a cure for our failure to implement fully fair informa-
tion practices has some hitherto unremarked flaws.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will frame the issue as a
20 SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. (OS)73-94, RECORDS, COMPUT-
ERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
21 Id. at 41.
22 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 82-101.
23 Cf. Oversight of the Privacy Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gov-
ernment Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of John
Shattuck, Legislative Director, ACLU) ("The Code of Fair Information Practices which
constitutes the core of the statute is so general and abstract that it has become little
more than precatory in practice, and has proved easy to evade.").
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problem in the control of information. It will identify the threats with re-
spect to the use and disclosure of information about which privacy advo-
cates have expressed the most concern, concentrating on the "cornerstone"
fair information principle that any information obtained for one purpose
should not be used for another purpose without the consent of the person.24
It will also try to identify exactly what privacy advocates have in mind
when they talk about "abuse" and "misuse" of information in government's
hands, and will describe how computers increase the challenge of devising
and achieving effective institutional solutions to information management
problems.
Part II will reformulate the issue, posing it not as one of the control of
information but explicitly as an issue in the control of government. Part II
will also offer a number of reasons why the task of formulating reliable
strategies for protecting informational privacy is so formidable: privacy is,
in practice and in principle, in genuine tension with other important substan-
tive goals; individuals are not good guardians of their own privacy rights;
government actors are poorly or unreliably motivated to protect citizens' pri-
vacy rights, and their performance as privacy protectors is difficult to moni-
tor; and institutional solutions to the privacy problem are elusive because
information itself is inherently difficult to contain within legal boundaries.
To illustrate its principal themes, Part II will survey the present legal land-
scape at the federal level, focusing on the Privacy Act of 1974,25 the Com-
puter Matching Act of 1988,26 and the Freedom of Information Act. 7 This
Article will conclude by offering an admittedly skeptical analysis of the
panacea that most privacy advocates continue to champion, namely a Feder-
al Data Protection Board.
I.
A crucial beginning for an inquiry that frames the privacy issue as one
of how to control information in the hands of government is to define, in
the abstract, the parameters of legitimate governmental use of information
that citizens provide to it, and whence the limits of legitimacy are derived.
Much of the privacy literature is permeated with a vague Orwellian angst
about this issue;28 sometimes attempts are made to give the angst a genuine
24 Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 81; see also JERRY BERMAN & JANLORI GOLDMAN,
A FEDERAL RIGHT OF INFORMATION PRIVACY: THE NEED FOR REFORM 12 (Benton
Foundation Project on Communications and Information Policy Options ed., 1989) (pro-
viding a way for an individual to prevent personal information obtained for one purpose
from being used for another purpose without consent "became the heart of the Privacy
Act and the information privacy legislation that followed").
25 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
26 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1994).
27 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
28 See, e.g., DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 1
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basis in reality. As one commentator has noted:
The privacy literature is liberally sprinkled with horror sto-
ries about inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant, or derogatory
information maintained in files; about personal information
kept far longer than is necessary; about access by unautho-
rized people and organizations; about data in the files of
private and public bodies not authorized to receive them;
about data being used out of context, for purposes other than
those for which they were collected; and about deliberate
intrusion and misuse of data files by unauthorized and autho-
rized personnel.29
Thus, from the literature one senses that there is reason for grave concern
that government soon will be-indeed that both government and private
entities are at this very moment-systematically engaged in "abuse" and
"misuse" of the vast amounts of personal information they have collected
from all of us for such a wide variety of purposes. The cries of alarm be-
come even more shrill when the overarching threat posed by computers'
enhanced capacities to store and manipulate information is seen as looming
over the scene.3"
From the horror stories and the angst, one particular worry consistently
emerges, namely, the apprehension that information gathered for one pur-
pose will be used or disclosed for different purposes.3 This concern arises,
it is asserted, because "[m]ost individuals agree to provide personal informa-
tion to ... governments because the benefits gained ... are worth the price
of diminished privacy. The cornerstone of that agreement, however, is the
individual's assumption that the information will not be used for purposes
(1989) ("[I]ndividuals in the Western world are increasingly subject to surveillance
through the use of data bases in the public and private sectors, and... these develop-
ments have negative implications for the quality of life in our societies and for the
protection of human rights."); Graham, supra note 12, at 1402 (suggesting that the "loss
of privacy is the most serious casualty of the information age"); George B. Trubow,
Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 521,
523 (1990) (declaring that personal privacy is "under siege").
29 COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLI-
CY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 35-36 (1992) (footnote omitted).
" Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 79 ("The United States must move quickly to ad-
dress the growing privacy problems that arise from the collection and transfer of per-
sonal information generated by computerized recordkeeping systems.").
"' See, e.g., Xavier R. Lopez, Balancing Information Privacy With Efficiency and
Open Access: A Concern of Government and Industry, 11 GOV'T INFO. Q. 255, 257-58
(1994); John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Com-
puter-Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1000 (1984).
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other than those for which it was collected."32
This Article will focus principally on the issue of whether information
obtained for one purpose should be used or disclosed, either within govern-
ment or to outsiders, for another purpose without the consent of the person.
The nature of the issue is surprisingly hard to pin down. The first question
to ask is what might justify a principle that would prohibit unconsented-to
use of information for other than the precise purpose for which it was dis-
closed. The answer is not immediately obvious. There is no data to support
the empirical claim that people assume that information will not be used for
other purposes. Indeed, many commentators implicitly acknowledge that in
most cases, people make no assumption at all about what will happen to the
information they supply. They are either careless33 or clueless34 about oth-
er uses that might be made of it. Indeed, if people did assume that informa-
tion supplied for one purpose would not be used for other purposes, their as-
sumption would be nothing if not counterfactual." Whether people ought
to be able to make such an assumption, however, is the real question to be
answered. Perhaps it is reality and not people's mistaken assumptions that
should be changed. The issue, then, is whether and under, what circumstanc-
es such sharing should be considered a priori "abusive" of a fair informa-
tion practice to which we genuinely wish to adhere-a practice which puts
true information, already disclosed by individuals to the government for one
purpose, to other uses for which it might be relevant. What unconsented-to
"collateral uses" of true information deserve to be opprobriously labelled
"abuses" or "misuses" of information, and why? These are the questions to
which this Article will turn momentarily. First it is important to clarify what
the "cornerstone principle"36 of "no unconsented-to use of information" is
not about.
The "cornerstone principle" is not about making use of inaccurate, irrel-
evant, or untimely information, nor is it about making decisions based on
erroneous data.37 There is, of course, an important individual and societal
32 Carol R. Williams, Note, A Proposal for Protecting Privacy During the Informa-
tion Age, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 119, 134-35 (1994) (emphasis added).
33 Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy, Government Information, and Technology, 46 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 629, 633 (1986) ("Most people are so accustomed to disclosing informa-
tion that they rarely think through all of the possible consequences.").
34 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 115 ("[E]ven in the case of information revealed with-
out unconscionable inducements, our intuitions have not caught up with our technology;
we do not understand the scope of a disclosure into an electronic environment.").
3 See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
36 Williams, supra note 32, at 134-35.
3' Cf. Dennis Southard IV, Individual Privacy and Governmental Efficiency:
Technology's Effect on the Government's Ability to Gather, Store and Distribute Infor-
mation, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 359, 370 (1989) (noting that when "large amounts of informa-
tion are being handled, the potential for both intentional and accidental misuse exists,"
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interest in not making decisions about individuals based on erroneous data
about them. Indeed, this interest in the accuracy of government records is
not only reflected in at least two provisions of the Code of Fair Information
Practices;38 it is also embodied in several provisions of the Privacy Act of
197439 and the Computer Matching Act.' It is quite uncontroversial to as-
sert that we want systems of government record-keeping and information
processing that reduce error as much as feasible, into which are built cost-
effective mechanisms for correcting errors that do occur, and out of which
have been squeezed, to the extent reasonably possible, the chance that re-
maining errors might become the basis for decisions that adversely affect
individuals. Error-free information processing is not an attainable' goal, but
the impact of inevitable processing errors can be substantially ameliorated
by the adoption of appropriate verification methods and decision-making
processes.
Note, however, that record-keeping methods and decision-making pro-
cesses are procedural strategies for avoiding errors. The need to devise such
strategies as part of a program of "fair information practices" implies that
information is "misused" or "abused" when decisions are based on data that
lacks a secure factual foundation. It is not "fair" to use or disclose untrue
information.
Note, on the other hand, that preventing unconsented-to disclosures has
to do with the use and dissemination of true-not false or misleading or
inaccurate-information. This fact raises the questions of how use or dis-
semination of true information could be "unfair," or could be said to repre-
sent a "misuse" or "abuse." By what criteria could use or dissemination of
true information be called "unfair"? Put another way, what justifications
support the claim that unconsented-to use or dissemination of true informa-
tion is wrong in principle? One place to begin looking for answers to these
questions, oddly enough, is with a brief list of contexts in which such dis-
closures or uses by government officials would probably be universally con-
demned: disclosure by government employees for their own personal gain or
amusement of true information about individuals acquired by the govern-
ment employees in the course of their official duties;4 gratuitous or mali-
citing an example of one case in which the Massachusetts welfare department threat-
ened to cut benefits to a woman because a bank account belonging to someone with a
similar social security number had been erroneously attributed to her, and using the
example of this one mistake to support the claim that "[a]s the use of new technology
increases, so does the potential for misuse") (emphasis added).
38 See supra text accompanying note 21.
3' 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(e)(5)-(6), (g)(1)(C) (1994).
4 Id. § 552a(o)(1)(E), (J).
4 For example, Internal Revenue Service employees in the southeastern United
States examined returns of celebrities and even collected information on divorced
individuals to sell to private investigators. Of 165 employees disciplined for these abus-
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cious disclosure of information obtained under a statutory or otherwise
legitimately relied-upon (because expressly tendered by a government offi-
cial) promise of non-disclosure;42 gratuitous or malicious public disclosure
of intimate or personally embarrassing facts in a context in which disclosure
could serve no conceivable public purpose; or use of legitimately acquired
personal information to intimidate a government official's political ene-
mies."' The common characteristic of these damnable practices is, of
course, that each entails a breach of the public trust in that each entails a
use or disclosure of information that serves no legitimate, legislatively-en-
dorsed public policy goal. The "cornerstone principle" of "no unconsented-
to use of information" condemns such practices. My point, though, is that it
also condemns unconsented-to uses and disclosures, either those within
government or to outsiders, of accurate information already given to gov-
ernment for one legitimate, legislatively-endorsed purpose that would make
a contribution to government's achievement of another legitimate, legisla-
tively-endorsed purpose. On what foundation rests the claim that such prac-
tices as these are so wrong in principle that preventing them is a "corner-
stone" of a system of fair information practices?
The claim to informational privacy that is embodied in the supposed
right to withhold consent from subsequent uses of true information about
oneself does not rest on the societal value of accurate decisionmaking by
government in individual cases; nor does it rest on the efficient achievement
of the government's policy goals. Indeed, claims to informational privacy
are in considerable tension with both accurate decisionmaking and efficient
policy implementation. Informational privacy is about individual control of
information regarding oneself. The instrumental function that privacy advo-
cates believe a right to informational privacy serves is to support the free-
dom of self-definition, the freedom to "edit" ourselves as we go along.
Informational privacy gives us "freedom to define ourselves," to let people
know only that which we think they should know about us." This freedom
in turn enhances individual autonomy, for when people have control over
information about themselves and can prohibit information disclosed for one
es, 36 were suspended, 17 fired, and the rest were reprimanded or sent to counseling.
See Invasion of Privacy: Some IRS Employees are Guilty of Snooping, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 7, 1994, at G2.
42 It is important to recognize that some "[p]romises of confidential treatment...
are of little value .... [b]ecause such promises cannot vary the agency's duty under
the FOIA to disclose all nonexempt information. . . ." Stephen S. Madsen, Note, Pro-
tecting Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrys-
ler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 113 (1980).
" It was abuses such as these that led to consideration and eventual passage of the
Privacy Act of 1974. For general background, see WAYNE MADSEN, HANDBOOK OF
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 100-03 (1992).
" Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 485 (1967).
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purpose from being used for another, they are more able than they otherwise
would be "to do what, for fear of an unpleasant or hostile reaction from
others, they would otherwise not do."'45 Individuals suffer a "potential chill-
ing effect on [their] exercise of ... independent judgment" when they know
that information about them may be used for a purpose different from that
for which it was gathered or that it may be disclosed to someone with inter-
ests adverse to their own.' "The right to control the flow of information
about oneself in order to escape unjustified social repercussions is essential
to protect actual identity." 47
A noteworthy feature of privacy advocates' arguments with respect to
the interest in controlling the use and dissemination of information in the
hands of government is that they do not view individuals' initial disclosures
to the government itself as anything like a fatal compromise of the right to
control information nor even a clear incursion on the subject's independent
judgment. The initial disclosure is almost never completely voluntary, for it
almost certainly is made in order to comply with the tax laws, to conform to
the mandates of a particular regulatory regime, or to qualify for a govern-
ment benefit of one kind or another. Although privacy advocates tend to dis-
miss arguments that the initial disclosure is appropriately deemed a "waiver"
of rights with respect to subsequent use,' they also do not justify their op-
position to subsequent disclosure on sustained arguments that the original
disclosure was genuinely coerced. Nor do they confront certain obvious
incongruities of their claims. On the one hand, privacy advocates assert that
individuals have a "right" to insist that information about them be used only
for the purpose for which it was gathered and that invasion of this right
impairs the individual capacity for independent judgment.49 On the other
hand, they find themselves having to acknowledge both the legal reality that
the "right" is simply not significantly protected by law, and the practical
'5 Graham, supra note 12, at 1411.
4 Southard, supra note 37, at 370.
4 Chlapowski, supra note 17, at 154; see also Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data
Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1976) ("When a citizen knows that his conduct and associations are being put on file
and that the information might be used to harass or injure him, he may become more
concerned about the possible content of that file and less willing to risk asserting his
expressional rights."); Peck, supra note 17, at 898-99 (1984) ("The chilling effect of a
loss of privacy is the undesirable incentive to conform to perceived societal norms
rather than assert one's individuality in ways that may threaten to cause a loss in per-
sonal or professional associations."); Tomkovicz, supra note 17, at 667 ("Just as confi-
dentiality-type privacy, in general, permits individuals to be themselves, to behave and
conduct their lives in ways that might otherwise be difficult and impractical, if not
inconceivable, constitutional informational privacy enables people to enjoy and freely
exercise other entitlements afforded by our free society.") (footnote omitted).
' See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 110-15.
49 Id. at 113-14.
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reality that in the modem world information about individuals is constantly,
uncontrollably, and inevitably being cycled and recycled; it is the indispens-
able coin of social, commercial, and political exchange." Thus, the idea
that individuals in any meaningful sense can--or should be able
to---"control" the circulation of facts about themselves does not mesh well
with the realities of this complex, information-hungry world in which we
live, this world in which the activist state has the biggest information-appe-
tite of all.
In addition to their failure to come to grips with these practical realities,
advocates of informational privacy as means to the end of self-definition
tend to give short shrift to a powerful, principled counter-argument. Permit-
ting individuals to control information about, and thus selectively to conceal,
their past may indeed enhance their autonomy ex ante by permitting them to
act without fear of an unfavorable reaction from others. This freedom to
engage in behavior that might evoke hostile reactions, however, is purchased
at others' expense. Indeed, the freedom being advocated is susceptible to
being recast in pejorative terms as a license to escape from responsibility for
the consequences of one's actions. Giving individuals the right to control the
use and dissemination of true information about themselves, and to limit its
use and disclosure to the precise purpose they had in mind when they ini-
tially disclosed it, in effect would countenance the concealment by them of
discreditable facts that would lower them in the esteem of others. "One
incentive for responsible behavior associated with publicity is the concrete
benefit of a good reputation."52 The ability to conceal discreditable facts
about oneself permits one to acquire that benefit without having to pay the
full behavioral price. In the context of personal information in the hands of
government, giving individuals the right to control information about them-
selves might permit them to avoid paying taxes they actually owe, to escape
meeting support obligations to their children, to avoid paying legitimate
debts, or to receive benefits to which they are not entitled. To embrace a
principle that would countenance such results would seem to be the equiva-
lent of endorsing the "fraudulent concealment" of personal information.53
o There are so many contexts in which information about individuals enhances
opportunities for fruitful and productive exchange that citations to support the proposi-
tion in text seem superfluous. Consider, for example, how central the free flow of infor-
mation about government and government officials is to a democracy, how essential
information about the integrity and reliability of potential contracting partners is in a
market economy, how significant to a satisfying social life and business career is one's
reputation, which is the effective summation of available information about oneself.
Indeed, the First Amendment itself testifies to the value of information about individu-
als, even to the point of privileging the publication of falsehoods so as not to chill the
publication of the truth. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"' See Graham, supra note 12, at 1411.
52 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 91.
13 For the clearest exposition of the economic arguments in favor of a legal regime
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At the very least, a stance embracing concealment raises the question of
why individuals should have the right to conceal information about that
which they fear others might consider to be their "defects," thus misleading
people-or the government-into dealing with them on terms more favor-
able than they would if they knew the truth. It is hard to imagine that, on
reflection, many individuals would choose to live in a world where everyone
was free to conceal discreditable facts about herself. Such a world would be
inherently unstable: individuals would search for-and no doubt find-so
many means of bonding the trustworthiness of their self-disclosures that the
baseline rule of "freedom to conceal" would tend to be overwhelmed by
evasive tactics. 4
Whether the substantive concerns that animate privacy advocates' argu-
ments have secure normative or positive foundations, the fears of privacy
advocates undoubtedly have been considerably exacerbated and in some
ways transformed in recent years by the incredible advances in computer
technology that have so vastly, and so incomprehensibly, increased the
government's capability to gather, store, manipulate, organize, compile,
transfer, distribute, and retrieve data.5 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
in which concealment of discreditable facts about oneself is treated similarly to fraud in
the sale of goods, see Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 1, 11-17, 24-30 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV.
393, 394-404 (1978).
"' Cf. George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 623, 626 (1980) (observing that "[t]he failure of contracts to emerge
which specify that the creditor may not sell the consumer credit information is in the
interest of debtors, for whom credit would otherwise be more expensive"); Rubin E.
Cruse, Jr., Note, Invasions of Privacy and Computer Matching Programs: A Different
Perspective, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 461, 472-75 (1992) (discussing verification function of
computer-matching programs as means of detecting "malfeasant" images, which permits
people to have more faith in the truthfulness 'of information, thus facilitating human
relations).
Some commentators have argued that many of the untoward repercussions that
follow from the dissemination of true information are themselves possibly unjustified.
They flow, so it is suggested, from misassessments of the information's present rele-
vance, or from too-pessimistic judgments about what the information signifies with
respect to its subject. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal Extent
of Disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 787-96
(1980) (outlining economic argument supporting refusal to disclose embarrassing per-
sonal details). Others have argued that with respect to certain intimate choices, especial-
ly those that are constitutionally protected, the case for informational privacy is at its
strongest. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 14, at 131-43.
" For two particularly comprehensive discussions of the ways in which computer
technology not only exacerbates but changes the nature of the privacy problem in the
activist state, see Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The
Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321
(1992), and Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L.
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how, without the aid of computers, an active government possibly could
have digested all the information for which it has developed such an insatia-
ble appetite. Be that as it may, three capabilities of the new technology
simultaneously enhance the government's ability to collect and add value to
information, exerting particular influence on the dimensions of the privacy
problem.
Before describing these phenomena, however, it is perhaps useful to be
reminded that information is a very desirable thing to have. Knowledge is
power-so goes the clich6; and as one wag noted, "the only way that three
people in Washington can keep a secret is if two of them are dead." As a
practical matter, information was difficult to protect from unwanted disclo-
sure even before the advent of computers. Information cannot be protected
from unauthorized use or disclosure by the simple expedient of putting or
keeping it in a secure physical location. Because it is intangible, information
is easy to "steal." Thefts also often go undetected, because victims do not
end up with less of anything tangible after the theft than they had before,
and thus they do not "miss" whatever information was taken. Information
has always had this characteristic.56 Computer technology only exacerbated
it.
57
One way that the new technology has exacerbated the difficulty of pro-
tecting information stems from the enormous-indeed the exponen-
tial-increase in computer processing and storage capacity that recent years
have witnessed. The federal government has not been slow to exploit this
increased capacity for purposes of more efficiently administering its own
programs. The government presently "utilizes the world's largest collection
of computers,"" and spends more than seventeen billion dollars per year
on information technology.59 This vastly increased computer storage and
processing capacity almost inevitably means that whatever kinds of misuses
or abuses of personal information take place, their numbers are likely to
increase.'
REV. 707 (1987).
56 Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 690-91 (1980).
17 See Ann W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and Computer Rogues: Tai-
loring the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 1-4
(1990); Brenda Nelson, Note, Straining the Capacity of the Law: The Idea of Computer
Crime in the Age of the Computer Worm, 11 COMPUT1ER/L.J. 299, 316-19 (1991).
58 Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1333.
59 Id. at 1334.
o John A. McLaughlin, Comment, Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusion in the
Computer Age, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 831, 836 (1984) (suggesting that before the
digital computer was introduced, "[p]ersonal information was difficult to secure and
compile, making large quantities of information concerning one individual unavailable.
Computer technology, however, has made these protections part of a lost era.") (foot-
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A second important aspect of the new technology is what one commen-
tator aptly describes as its capacity for "multifunctionality."6 Once person-
al information is transformed into binary codes, "the computer can efficient-
ly compare it and combine it with other digital data. The computer changes
personal information into a fluid form, which allows it to be applied at
many stages of administrative decisionmaking."62 Multifunctionality per-
mits such practices as computer matching, the electronic comparison of two
or more sets of records to find individuals included in more than one data-
base;63 computer assisted front-end verification, which electronically ac-
cesses already existing databases in order to certify accuracy and complete-
ness of personal information given at the time of an actual application for
government benefits;64 and computer profiling, which searches for specified
elements or combinations of elements in a number of different record sys-
tems.65
Multifunctionality has obvious benefits. Computer matching helps detect
and prevent fraud and improves management. Front-end verification helps in
debt collection,66 and assists in guaranteeing eligibility of benefit applicants
before, rather than after, benefit payments begin, thus protecting program
integrity. Profiling assists law enforcement agents to identify possible tax
evaders and drug couriers.
Nevertheless, multifunctionality has potential shortcomings. Computer
matches may produce excessive numbers of false positives-too many of
their "hits" may turn out to be misses for the exercise to be worthwhile.67
Profiling may tempt government officials to go on "fishing expeditions"
rather than targeting their investigations to people reasonably suspected of
crime.6' Likewise, profiling might serve as a cover for racially motivated or
otherwise illegitimately biased enforcement decisions. 69 On a more ephem-
eral but perhaps equally disturbing note, one commentator has noted the "se-
note omitted).
61 Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1339.
62 Id.
63 See Regan, supra note 33, at 630.
64 id. at 632.
65 Id.
6 The Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1749 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.), for example, requires applicants for federal
loans to supply their Social Security numbers, and requires agencies to screen credit
applicants against IRS files to check for tax delinquency.
67 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
6' See SENATE REPORT ON THE COMPUTER MATCHING AND PRIVACY PROTECTION
ACT OF 1988, S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988).
69 See Kenneth J. Langan, Note, Computer Matching Programs: A Threat to Priva-
cy?, 15 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 143, 147 (1979).
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ductive precision" of the answers given by computers; 71 another has
warned of the consequences of the "loss of context" that automated process-
ing creates: "The very moment the matching begins, the data are itemized
and disconnected from their original collection situation. Yet neither hard
facts nor judgments can be separated at will from their context without
distorting the information. Consequently, every step toward routinized pro-
cessing accentuates the danger of misrepresentations and false conclu-
sions. '71 The trick for information managers and privacy policymakers is to
devise strategies that enable government to maximize the efficiencies that
multifunctionality makes possible while minimizing the harm it might cause.
The third noteworthy aspect of the new technology is that it permits
decentralization of government control of information. The ability to store
information on discs permits widespread sharing of data in computer form.
Minicomputers, as ubiquitous in government offices as in the private sector,
permit individual users to gain access to centralized records, and allow
individual users to create their own databases. That computer records sys-
tems can be directly linked via telecommunications systems not only ac-
counts for a substantial increase in the exchange of information within gov-
ernment and among agencies, but also greatly increases the number of peo-
ple having access to that information. The decentralization that the new
technology permits magnifies the already substantial difficulty of maintain-
ing confidentiality of information within government, and throws a road-
block in the way of monitoring employee compliance with rules intended to
guard the confidentiality of personal information.
II.
The legal landscape with respect to the use and disclosure of informa-
tion about individuals in government's hands is dominated, though not quite
controlled, by three generic statutes. First, there is the Privacy Act of
1974;73 second, there is the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
of 1988 (the Computer Matching Act),74 which is part of the Privacy Act;
and third, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),75 which occupies a
prominent place in the federal statutory terrain. I shall discuss each of these
major legislative initiatives in turn, hoping to illustrate the issues in the
control of government that efforts to protect the privacy of personal infor-
mation present.
70 Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1341.
" Simitis, supra note 55, at 718.
72 See Regan, supra note 33, at 629; Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1334.
7 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
7' 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1994).
'5 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
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In addition, specific statutory provisions impose particularized nondisclo-
sure obligations on certain agencies, including the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice76 and the Census Bureau.77 Except to note their existence, this Article
shall not discuss these statutes. Such a project would be well worth under-
taking, but to attempt to cast light on the operation of particular species of
privacy protection would require a depth of inquiry into the bureaucratic
culture of specific agencies that would carry this Article beyond its intended
scope.
Before proceeding to the statutory analysis, it is useful to make the
following important point: Once individuals have disclosed information
about themselves to the government, unconsented-to use or disclosure of
that information by the government can take place in two paradigmatically
different contexts. The first is use by or disclosure to another agency within
government, for the purpose of preserving the integrity of government bene-
fit programs, or of aiding law enforcement, or of collecting debts. The sec-
ond context in which unconsented-to use or disclosure of information sup-
plied to government can take place is disclosure outside the government,
pursuant, for example, to a FOIA request from a non-governmental entity.
Although the distinction is seldom explicitly recognized, nor is its analytical
importance often acknowledged in the literature, the two contexts tend to
implicate different privacy concerns as well as to generate different interests
in disclosure.
Consider first the use or disclosure of information by the agency to
whom it is given to another agency within government. Although such
unconsented-to disclosure might result in adverse consequences to the indi-
vidual-the termination of government benefits, for example, or the levy of
additional tax liability-it is not likely to result in the kind of personal em-
barrassment that would follow from disclosure of intimate or embarrassing
76 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6103 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (making tax returns and return
information confidential and not subject to disclosure unless authorized by Congress);
I.R.C. § 7431 (1988) (creating a civil remedy for unauthorized disclosures). For a re-
view of the legal issues surrounding unauthorized disclosures of tax return information,
see Allan Karnes & Roger Lively, Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal Revenue
Code Provisions to Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Infor-
mation, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 924 (1993).
" See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1994) (providing for the confidentiality of census
data). These sections have been strictly enforced against the government. See, e.g.,
McNichols v. Klutznick, 644 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that cities may
not discover raw census data in suits to challenge representative apportionment by pop-
ulation based on those data), affd sub nom. Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
For a brief discussion praising the Census Bureau's protection of confidentiality, and
linking that protection to the public's willingness to participate in the census, see Harry
A. Scarr, Privacy Protection and Data Dissemination at the Census Bureau, 11 GOV'T
INFO. Q. 249 (1994).
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facts about oneself to one's neighbors or friends.
In order to put the "privacy as control over unconsented-to use" issue in
the context of information-sharing within government into stark relief, as-
sume that the information being shared is relevant to the purpose of both
agencies; that the sharing is done not by rogue employees acting on a whim,
but rather pursuant to officially endorsed agency policy; that the information
is timely and true; that either the disclosing or the receiving agency could
legitimately require the individual to whom the information pertains to sup-
ply it before taking action either to benefit or to disadvantage her; and that
the individual would have neither a Fourth nor a Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to disclose the information to either agency. On this set of assump-
tions, the "privacy interest" with regard to the information would seem to
recede into virtual inconsequence, if not to disappear altogether. The respec-
tive agencies' substantive power of control over the facet of life to which
the information pertains, and their concomitant entitlement to demand that
the information be supplied, would quite dwarf an individual's claim of a
residual right to "control the information" itself and to limit its use or dis-
closure to the particular purpose for which it was disclosed. The point here
is not that the individual would have "waived" her privacy interest by the
initial disclosure for a particular purpose to a particular agency. Rather, the
point is that vis-A-vis the government generally, and its demands that citi-
zens supply it with personal information in connection with its regulatory,
welfare, revenue-raising, or crime-fighting agenda, an individual has very
little in the way of a "privacy interest" to be waived. Moreover, on the
specified set of assumptions, the public interest in disclosure by one agency
to another would also appear to be quite high, because it is a function of the
information's relevance and contribution to the receiving agency's substan-
tive agenda.
Now turn to the second context in which unconsented-to use or disclo-
sure of information supplied to the government takes place: namely, the
context in which the government reveals the information to outsiders. A
familiar example of this is disclosure of information pursuant to a FOIA
request. In this context, it would be quite inappropriate to make the set of
assumptions that expose the weakness of the "privacy as control of infor-
mation" claim where the disclosure is from one government agency to an-
other. The principal reason is that, unlike a government agency with whom
information germane to its purposes is shared by the agency to whom it was
initially given, a private requester has no colorable legal entitlement to the
information apart from that conferred upon her by FOIA.78 However wor-
thy her motives, moreover, and however widely beneficial the uses to which
she intends to put the information, a private requester cannot claim to be
78 See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
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doing the public's business in the same sense that a governmental agency
can. Notably, disclosure of personal information to a private requester car-
ries a much greater potential to embarrass, to annoy, or to subject the indi-
vidual to harassment and intrusions on her seclusion than does intra- or
inter-governmental disclosure. In other words, disclosure of personal infor-
mation in government's hands to outsiders is far less likely to serve a legis-
latively-endorsed public interest, and far more likely to invade a substantial
privacy interest, than is sharing the same information within the government.
Regarding disclosure of 'information in government's hands, the law
reflects the significant differences between the privacy and the disclosure
interests implicated by unconsented-to use or disclosure of information by
the government to other governmental agencies and to private requesters.79
As will be described in more detail below, the Privacy Act and the Comput-
er Matching Act, for example, place relatively few substantive barriers in
the way of inter- or intra-governmental sharing of personal information, thus
illustrating both the relative weakness of the privacy interest and the relative
strength of the interest in disclosure in the context of information shared by
the government with other government agencies. FOIA, on the other hand,
exempts information whose disclosure would invade personal privacy from
the otherwise pervasive obligation upon agencies to disclose their records."0
Moreover, as FOIA has come to be interpreted by the Supreme Court,
where privacy interests would be threatened by disclosure, the statute man-
dates disclosure of only that information which serves FOIA's legislatively
71 In his provocative essay, Seth Kreimer speaks of two ways in which the "expan-
sion of government knowledge translates into an increase in the effective power of
government." Kreimer, supra note 14, at 5. The first, and more mundane, arises from
the sharing of computerized personal information among government agencies, which
permits government to enforce existing laws more efficiently. Id. The second, quite
different kind of increase arises from what Kreimer implies is a consciously deployed
governmental strategy to use the volume of information controlled by it "to sanction
disfavored activities by the simple act of public disclosure." Id. at 6. Kreimer's essay
focuses on the latter. It describes the conflict between "exposure" ("sunlight") of infor-
mation in government's hands as a punishment, a deterrent, and a component of in-
formed democratic decisionmaking, and "secrecy" of such information as necessary to
the protection of "sanctuaries of private liberty from state intervention." Id. at 7. Little,
if anything, in either the text or the legislative history of FOIA would support the con-
clusion that FOIA embodies the self-conscious enlisting by government of the power of
disclosure to punish or deter disfavored private activities. Instead, the Act is exclusively
concerned with disclosure to citizens of what "their government is up to." Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 773 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the important point is that
disclosure to the public, represented by a FOIA requester, of personal information in the
hands of government both implicates different privacy interests and serves generically
different public purposes than does disclosure of the same information to another gov-
ernment agency.
80 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994).
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endorsed "central purpose" of contributing significantly to public under-
standing of the operations of the government.8 Thus FOIA's exemptions,
and the Court's interpretation of the disclosure interest against which they
are to be weighed, mirror both the relative strength of the privacy interest
and the relative narrowness of the disclosure interest in the context of shar-
ing information with outsiders.
A. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 197482 establishes general requirements for the
management of personal records by agencies of the executive branch of the
federal government. It gives citizens the right to learn how agencies collect,
maintain, use, and disseminate personal information.83 It grants individuals
rights of access to personal information maintained about them, and permits
them to seek amendment of any incorrect or incomplete information.84 In
fact, the Privacy Act might be considered an "enactment" of the Code of
Fair Information Practices. At least insofar as the practices of "agencies of
the federal government are concerned, the Privacy Act purports to address
all the major concerns of privacy advocates.
By requiring federal agencies to give a variety of notices, both to indi-
viduals and to the public, the Privacy Act addresses the concern that there
be no secret system of records. At the point of data collection, for example,
an agency must inform individuals of its authority to request the informa-
tion, of the purposes for which the information is to be used, of the routine
uses which may be made of the information, and of the effects on the indi-
vidual of not supplying it. 5 When agencies establish or revise a system of
records, they must publish a notice in the Federal Register to that effect, in-
cluding specific information about the system.86 This required disclosure of
the very existence of record systems has been termed "one of the demon-
strable, continuing benefits of the Privacy Act in controlling surveil-
lance. 87
The Privacy Act addresses the concern that individuals be able to find
out what personal information about them is in the file and how it is being
used by granting individuals the right to review this information in a gov-
ernment agency's "system of records."88 It also requires agencies to keep
8! Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773-77.
82 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
83 Id. § 552a(e)(3)-(4).
84 Id. § 552a(d)(1)-(2).
85 Id. § 552a(e)(3).
86 Id. § 552a(e)(4).
87 FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 321.
88 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).
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accounts of disclosures of records 9 and to make such accounts available to
individuals named in the records.' The concern that individuals be given a
way to correct or amend records of identifiable information about them-
selves is met by granting them the right to challenge the content of such
records for accuracy, completeness, relevance, and timeliness.9
The Privacy Act also addresses the concern that individuals be able to
prevent information obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without their consent. In a provision said to be
"the heart of the Privacy Act"'92 despite its being subject to a number of
significant exceptions, 93 the Act prohibits disclosure of personal informa-
tion by an agency without the subject's consent.94 Finally, the Act address-
es the concern for reliability and the need to prevent misuse (due to poor
quality) of personal data by imposing a number of quality-control obliga-
tions on agencies. For example, agencies must maintain only information
that is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency; 9
when possible, agencies must collect information directly from the subject
individual;96 they must maintain records "with such accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to
the individual";9  and they must make reasonable efforts to assure, prior to
releasing any records, that they are "accurate, complete, timely, and rele-
vant."
98
The Act addresses-or purports to address-the concern that the govern-
ment will unjustifiably disclose personal information or put information
gathered for one purpose to a different use, to the (presumably unjustified)
disadvantage of the individual. Subject to a number of specific, and impor-
tant, exceptions,99 it prohibits disclosure of personal information by an
agency without the subject's consent" and requires agencies to keep accu-
rate accountings of the disclosures that are made. °1
The unfortunate reality, however, is that the Privacy Act is a paper tiger.
For two principal reasons, the Act has failed to achieve its objectives. One
reason is that the Act's substantive provisions are riddled with loopholes
89 Id. § 552a(c)(4).
90 Id.
9, Id. § 552a(d)(2).
92 BERMAN & GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 12.
" The exceptions are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
94 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
" Id. § 552a(e)(1).
96 Id. § 552a(e)(2).
9' Id. § 552a(e)(5).
98 Id. § 552a(e)(6).
9 Id. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
00 Id. § 552a(b).
Id. § 552a(c).
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and laced with exceptions. The second is that the "individual rights" en-
forcement model upon which the Act is based is, in several important re-
spects, inadequate to the task.
The "individual rights" enforcement model translates into a
heavy-indeed, an excessive and surely unrealistic-enforcement burden
upon individuals:
The Privacy Act requires that individuals be aware of their
rights, understand the. potential threats posed by agency
collection and use of such information, and be willing to
invest the time and money necessary to protect their inter-
ests. These requirements place a burden on the individual.
Every time an individual comes in contact with a bureau-
cracy seeking personal information, he or she must question
the purposes for which information is sought and the neces-
sity of each item of information.
To ensure that information is not misused, the individual
must follow up to make sure that no new information is
added to the file, and that the uses and disclosures of infor-
mation are in keeping with the agency's stated purposes. If
individuals find that files contain inaccurate or irrelevant
information, or that information is used for improper purpos-
es, then they need to know what legal remedies are available
and take action against the agency. Such a procedure means
that individuals need to be conscious of their rights at every
stage of the information-handling process. Most people are
so accustomed to disclosing information that they rarely
think through all of the possible consequences. In addition,
the time, and secondarily, the money, necessary to monitor
the status of one's personal information and to take legal
action are prohibitive for the average individual." 2
102 Regan, supra note 33, at 633; see also Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 87 (regarding
putting the burden on individuals for identifying improper data collection practices and
making corrections in personal records, "[w]hen information is shared across the Feder-
al government or between public and private organizations, it becomes increasingly
difficult to identify problems and resolve complaints"); Schwartz, supra note 55, at
1380 (noting that "if the 'laymen' in Congress are unable to understand data processing
systems within government bureaucracy, the ordinary citizen has no hope of compre-
hension. Data subjects are unlikely to have the resources and technical expertise to
understand the arrangement of information processing, the employment of their personal
data, and the extent of their rights."); Donsia R. Strong, Note, The Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 1988: Necessary Relief from the Erosion of the Privacy
Act of 1974, 2 SOFTWARE L.J. 391, 413 n.135 (1988) (observing that "individuals do
not litigate potential claims because the data may have been transferred without a given
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In addition to the inordinate general difficulties with which the Act con-
fronts individual enforcers, the Act creates some specific obstacles to vigor-
ous individual enforcement. For example, notices about the existence and
revision of records appear in the Federal Register,"3 which is not easily
accessible to individuals. Indeed, it has rightly been described as an "ar-
cane ... source of information for the general public."'0 4 Moreover, the
remedies provided in the Act do not suggest that Congress intended to en-
courage aggressive individual enforcement. The Act gives federal courts
limited authority. The courts can issue injunctions "in only two instances: to
amend (i.e., correct) the individual's record, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(A), and
to order an agency to produce agency records improperly withheld from an
individual, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A)."'' ° In other words, an individual
cannot by injunction stop an agency from violating the Act in the future,"
with the result that the government "may keep its practices unaltered and
litigate the occasional claim."'0 7 Nor does the fact that individuals will "lit-
igate the occasional claim" represent a formidable threat to the government.
The Act permits individuals to recover damages only if a violation has an
"adverse effect" on them,10 8 only if the court finds that the agency acted
"in a manner which was intentional or willful,"'" and only in the amount
of "actual damages" sustained."0
More importantly, the Privacy Act is a paper tiger because loopholes in,
and exceptions to, its substantive provisions significantly reduce its effective
scope."' For example, agency heads may by rule exempt some systems of
records from compliance with the access and disclosure provisions of the
Act, including those maintained by the CIA, the Secret Service, and other
law enforcement agencies; those maintained for statistical purposes; and
those compiled in the course of determining eligibility for various federal
individual's knowledge and they may not know of the injury; the chances of succeeding
are slim; their financial resources may be limited; and/or the size of the agency may be
intimidating").
03 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4).
104 FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 321.
'os Edison v. Department of the Army, 672 F.2d 840, 846 (11 th Cir. 1982).
'o Hearings, supra note 23, at 240 (testimony of Ronald Plesser, former general
counsel, Privacy Protection Study Commission).
07 Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1379 n.283.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (1994).
,o Id. § 552a(g)(4).
10Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A). Some courts hold that "actual damages" include damages for
physical and mental injury. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 986
(5th Cir. 1983). Other courts hold that "actual damages" limits plaintiffs to recovery of
pecuniary losses. See Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 1982).
.. See generally PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 515-26 (1977) (discussing use limitation and information
management principles) [hereinafter STUDY COMMISSION REPORT].
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positions.'12 Furthermore, although the Act defines "record" as "any item,
collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained
by an agency,""' 3 and thus could potentially cover "every record that con-
tains any kind of information associated with that individual, ' "" the Act's
definition actually only applies to a record that is retrieved from a "system
of records" by the "name of the individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual."".5 Thus,
the Act does not in fact restrict disclosures of every "record" that contains
any kind of individually identifiable information. None of the Act's
protections accrue to an individual whose records are not accessed by name,
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular. Accordingly,
"many records containing sensitive personal information""' 6 are effectively
beyond the Act's protection, an observation whose accuracy several courts
have confirmed." 7
The most worrisome loophole, however, is the Act's allowance of all
disclosures for a "routine use,""11 8 which the Act defines as a "purpose
which is compatible with the purpose for which [the information] was col-
lected.""' 9 The Act itself does not prescribe a standard of compatibility,
and each agency head is accordingly the "ultimate arbiter of what it means"
insofar as her own agency's practices are concerned. 2 ' The Privacy Pro-
tection Study Commission discovered after the Act had been in force for
32 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
", Id. § 552a(a)(4).
"" Hosch, supra note 17, at 149.
"' 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5).
16 Hosch, supra note 17, at 149.
17 See, e.g., Chapman v. NASA, 682 F.2d 526, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
notes taken by a supervisor in evaluating employees for job assignments or promotion
are not "systems of records" because they were kept in the personal files of the supervi-
sor and never integrated into any system of records); American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. NASA, 482 F. Supp. 281, 282-83 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that sign-in/sign-out
sheets for federal employees are not a "system of records" because they do not contain
specific, personal information); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 503 F. Supp. 653, 655-56
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that information communicated in a phone call is not a "sys-
tem of records" because it is not retrievable by means of a personal identifier);
Smiertka v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 447 F. Supp. 221, 228 (D.D.C. 1978)
(holding that information pertaining to the requester need not be disclosed unless the
information is retrievable by means of the requester's own name or other personal iden-
tifier, and "[t]hat it can be easily retrieved in some other way by some other identifier
is wholly beside the point").
38 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). For a thorough discussion of the "routine use" exception,
see Todd R. Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An
Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957 (1991).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (emphasis added).
120 See FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 323.
482 [Vol. 4:2
MECHANISMS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
only two years that, while some agencies interpreted "routine use" narrowly,
others interpreted it very broadly, permitting such practices as disclosure to
another agency "'to the extent that the information relates to the requesting
agency's decision on the matter.""''  The President's 1982-83 Annual Re-
port on the Agencies' Implementation of the Privacy Act concluded:
even a casual examination of agencies' routine uses suggests
that agencies interpret the concept of compatibility to permit
uses that are neither functionally or programmatically related
to the original collection purpose. In some cases this is due
to requirements imposed by statute .... In other cases, it is
due to a deliberate interpretation on the part of the agency
that a particular disclosure would be "necessary and proper"
to the operation of a governmental program. This interpreta-
tion looks more to the literal definition of compatibili-
ty--capable of existing together without discord or dishar-
mony. 2
OMB guidelines issued in 1982, before the Computer Matching Act
was enacted, deemed computer matching a "routine use."123 Furthermore,
the OMB seemed to encourage and promote data sharing among federal
agencies, 12 rather than constraining sharing according to what might have
been thought to be the spirit of the Privacy Act,"2 by inviting agencies to
"seek to satisfy new information needs through legally authorized interagen-
cy or intergovernmental sharing of information.' 26
Accordingly, it may well be the case that the observer who asserted at
the Privacy Act Oversight Hearings in 1983 that "[i]f someone looks at the
Privacy Act and thinks that it does, in fact, limit disclosure, I think that
2! STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 111, at 517 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg.
40,015 (1976)).
22 Management of Federal Information Resources, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,730, 52,751
(1985); see also FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 323
'23 Privacy Act of 1974; Revised Supplemental Guidance for Conducting Matching
Programs, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,656, 21,657 (1982).
'24 Management of Federal Information Resources, 50 Fed. Reg. at 52,751.
125 Cf. BERMAN & GOLDMAN, supra note 24, at 14 ("Congress' [sic] original intent
in enacting the Privacy Act was thwarted by the government's interpretation of the 'rou-
tine use' exemption ....
126 Id.
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person is sorely mistaken"'' 2 painted a more accurate picture of the reality
of the Act's bite than would emerge from simply parsing its text. In fact:
Because no external agent actually audits or really questions
the information-handling practices of federal agencies [and
because each agency accordingly has almost complete auton-
omy to interpret the Act according to its own understanding],
it is impossible to know how the Privacy Act's standards are
being applied in practice, although considerable skepticism
has been expressed over the years.'28
Finally, until relatively recently at least, the Privacy Act's commitment
to nondisclosure was in apparent tension with, and in some cases expressly
trumped by, the Freedom of Information Act's commitment to disclosure.
Among the several exceptions to the Privacy Act's prohibition on agency
disclosure of personal information to third parties is an express exemption
for disclosure that is "required under section 552 of this title"' 29-that is,
for disclosures required by FOIA. FOIA in turn requires that agencies pro-
vide the public with access to federal agency records, and that "any person"
making an appropriate request be given access to inspect and copy such
records. 30 FOIA is based on the proposition that, just as information about
citizens and their activities is the handmaiden of the modern activist state,
information about government is the handmaiden of democracy. 3' More-
over, under FOIA, once characterized by an astute commentator as "an
extraordinary piece of antiprivacy legislation,"'32 disclosure is mandatory
127 Hearings, supra note 23, at 224 (testimony of Ronald Plesser, former general
counsel, Privacy Protection Study Commission).
128 FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 322.
29 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1994).
0 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994).
'3 James Madison is everyone's favorite authority for the wisdom of the Act's un-
derlying purposes:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will for-
ever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910).
Not everyone agrees that making information about government more readily avail-
able ought to be as high a priority as the Act makes it, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The
Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14, or
even that it serves democracy particularly well, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The
State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1328, 1343 (1994).
132 Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 776.
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unless one of nine exceptions permitting, but not requiring, nondisclosure
applies.133 This Article now turns to a more detailed examination of the
intersection between FOIA's disclosure mandates and the protection of per-
sonal privacy.
B. The Freedom of Information Act
By its own terms, FOIA does not require agencies to be completely
oblivious to privacy concerns. "To the extent required to prevent a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," FOIA permits an agency to
"delete identifying details" when it publishes opinions, policy statements,
and the like, so long as the agency complies with the mandate that "the
justification for the deletion shall be explained fully in writing. 134
FOIA's most important privacy protections, however, are contained in
two of the nine exemptions, which explicitly permit agencies to resist dis-
closure when necessary to protect the privacy of individuals. Subsection
(b)(6) exempts from mandatory disclosure "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy,"'35 and (b)(7) exempts records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of
such records "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. 136
In recent years, the Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions so as
to enhance agencies' ability to invoke them as shields to repel requests that
records containing personally identifiable information about individuals be
released.1 7 Before turning to these cases, however, it is important to rec-
ognize that FOIA's other provisions, its basic structure, and the bureaucratic
incentives it creates generate considerable tension between the government's
obligation to protect citizens' privacy on the one hand and its obligation to
conduct its business openly so as to be accountable to its citizens on the
other.
In this regard, consider first the Act's overall design and the incentives
of the bureaucrats subject to its provision. The Act's formal provisions are
heavily tilted toward disclosure. Whereas the exemptions are permissive, 38
disclosure is mandatory-all documents not specifically exempted must be
33 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1A)-(9).
131 Id. § 552(a)(2)(C); see also id. § 552(b) (providing that "[any reasonably
segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record
after deletion of the portions which are exempt").
135 Id. § 552(b)(6).
136 Id. § 552(b)(7).
137 See infra text accompanying notes 160-206.
138 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1979).
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disclosed.'39 The Act provides sanctions against officials who improperly
withhold information,"4 but not on those who improperly release informa-
tion. 4 Judicial review of agency decisions to withhold is also "stacked by
the statute in favor of disclosure."' 42 The Act places the burden on a with-
holding agency to justify nondisclosure,'43 and pernits prevailing plaintiff-
requesters to be awarded attorney's fees.'" More important perhaps is that
the individuals about whom the information is sought-namely, those per-
sons with the greatest, indeed the only personal, stake in confidentiali-
ty-seem rarely to be parties to litigation over the privacy exemptions. 45
Those individuals must depend on government officials-whose personal
and professional agendas are likely to differ quite markedly from the
individuals' own-to identify, articulate, and vigorously defend their privacy
interests."4 "Sometimes the government's interests will overlap those of
the person whose privacy is at stake; more often they will not."'47 In addi-
"3 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) ("Each agency shall make available to the public .... ") (em-
phasis added); see also Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 371-75
(1976) (discussing Congressional intent behind Exemption 6).
5~  U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F)-(G).
Compare, for example, the sanctions that apply when government officials violate
the Privacy Act. See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.
142 Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 797.
"43 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
I' d. § 552(a)(4)(E).
41 ALLAN R. ADLER, LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS
139 (1992) (noting that "[c]ases in which data subjects seek to enjoin its release under
the FOIA are quite rare").
"4 Cf. Lawrence A. Silver, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation in a Non-
Commercial Setting: The Case of Professor Doe, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 455, 474 (1982)
("It is troubling that ... the rights ... of a person threatened with a possible invasion
of privacy should only have the protection offered by a litigant with interests quite
divergent from his own."); Heather Harrison, Note, Protecting Personal Information
From Unauthorized Government Disclosures, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 775, 790 (1992)
(suggesting that individuals are "forced to rely on the government to protect their priva-
cy interests with the very real possibility that the government may choose not to with-
hold the information if no governmental interest is jeopardized").
"' Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 800. Occasionally these real parties in interest
manage to make their voices heard during the litigation. See, e.g., New York Times Co.
v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (In the course of remanding to the
district court for a determination of whether disclosure of the tape of the voice commu-
nication from the doomed Challenger Space Shuttle would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy, the D.C. Circuit held the tape to be information
that "applies to an individual" and thus a "similar file" within Exemption 6, and noted
that the "families of the astronauts attempted to explain in camera the basis for their
privacy claims."); cf. Madsen, supra note 42, at 112-13. In discussing agency incentives
with respect to the invocation of FOIA Exemption 4, which protects trade secrets and
confidential commercial or financial information from mandatory disclosure, Madsen
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tion, although the deadlines are often honored in the breach, the Act requires
those officials to decide quickly whether to act to protect privacy; they must
determine whether to comply with any FOIA request "within ten days" of
its receipt."4
Just as is the case with respect to agency implementation of the Privacy
Act, generalization about how FOIA is actually administered is exceptional-
ly risky. Like the Privacy Act, FOIA applies to all federal agencies, each
one of which is pursuing its own distinct substantive mission and generating
its own unique bureaucratic culture. 49 Similarly,
[a]dministering the Act is in many ways a discretionary task
that continues to present two challenges largely ignored by
statutory and case law, directives and regulations, and per-
sonnel practices despite a 20-year history. The first emanates
from the nature of information as a product; the second from
defining the position of "access professional."'50
With respect to the first challenge, many records must be examined on a
case-by-case basis, and much turns on the "position, background, and train-
ing""15 of the administrator making the decision of whether to disclose.
With regard to the second challenge, there is still no uniform job descrip-
tion, set of qualifications, or consistently identifiable career path for the
"access professionals" who make most of the government's FOIA decisions.
"Inevitably and frequently, people with such differing backgrounds and
noted:
Several factors... may lead administrators to invoke the fourth exemption spar-
ingly. First, agency personnel sometimes elect to disclose confidential business
information despite the exemption, believing that the public interest in disclosure
outweighs potential harm to submitter interests. In addition, agencies typically
gain little by invoking the exemption and may not wish to assume the burden and
risk of litigation with the requester solely to protect the submitter's interests.
Moreover, it is often not apparent that the exemption applies to particular infor-
mation. The statutory language is opaque, and the judicial tests evolved for apply-
ing it require a knowledge of the submitter's circumstances that few administra-
tors will possess. When coupled with the prodisclosure pressures of the FOIA and
the tremendous number of FOIA requests some agencies must process, these
difficulties of interpretation make inadvertent disclosures especially likely.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
On the importance of agency culture to the way in which legislative directives are
actually implemented, see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 14-28 (1989).
ISo Lotte E. Feinberg, Managing the Freedom of Information Act and Federal Infor-
mation Policy, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 615, 617 (1986).
151 Id.
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professional training disagree over whether certain documents should be re-
leased."' 52 Nevertheless, with respect to the privacy/access tension, if bu-
reaucratic incentives are systematically skewed, it seems a fair bet that the
skew is in exactly the opposite direction from that which the "public inter-
est" would seem to require. On the one hand, bureaucrats would seem to
have little natural inclination to honor the "public's right to know" with
regard to the bureaucrats' actions, especially if to do so might render them
vulnerable to being charged with misfeasance or just plain poor judg-
ment.'53 On the other hand, the bureaucrats themselves will not suffer per-
sonal embarrassment or other untoward personal consequences if informa-
tion entrusted to their agency is wrongfully used or disclosed. When the
government's own interest overlaps with individuals' privacy interests, it
would seem as likely as not that it is the agency's assessment of how best
to advance its own interest, at least as much as its genuine and consistently
dependable commitment to protecting privacy, that explains the agency's
decision to claim the exemption. The point here is not that bureaucrats never
invoke the privacy provisions, or that when they do so they never act in
good faith. Rather, the point is simply that protecting privacy is likely to be
a matter of secondary priority, at best a side-constraint, in the bureaucrats'
own conception of where their duties lie and how they ought to do their
jobs. 54
In addition to the basic tilt away from aggressive privacy protection
created by the formal provisions and basic structure of FOIA, the fact seems
to be that the bureaucratic deck is stacked to tilt in a similar direction. In
setting its agenda and determining whether to invoke the privacy exemption,
each agency can be expected to give privacy protection a back seat to its
own primary enforcement mission. And there are likely to be few, if any,
internal "bureaucratic rewards for attempting to give privacy a higher visi-
bility." '155
152 Id.
"' For a helpful brief recounting of the history of the Act, tracing its history from "a
long tradition of departmental control of information," through the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act of 1946 and its weak and vague provisions granting public access to certain
administrative materials, to the "revolutionary" Freedom of Information Act of 1966
and its "broad norm of disclosure and access with relatively narrow exceptions," see
Glen 0. Robinson, Access to Government Information: The American Experience, 14
FED. L. REv. 35, 35-41 (1983).
"' As one privacy advocate asserted: "When privacy requirements conflict with other
Federal agency goals, there is little guarantee that individual rights will prevail."
Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 87; see also Trubow, supra note 28, at 542 (noting that
"[a] concern for privacy is the natural enemy of a government bureaucrat who pursues
agency objectives with costs and efficiency in mind").
"' Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of
Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199, 238
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The tension between the government's obligation to protect personal
information it collects from disclosure and its FOIA-imposed obligation to
conduct its business openly was for several years exacerbated by judicial
interpretations that rendered a coherent account of FOIA's privacy exemp-
tions impossible.'56 Courts failed to articulate a consistent conception of
the nature and extent of the privacy values that FOIA's nondisclosure pro-
visions were intended to advance or to announce criteria for determining
when invasions of privacy would be clearly or plainly unwarranted. Begin-
ning in 1982, with its unanimous decision in United States Department of
State v. Washington Post Co.,'57 the Supreme Court began the process of
clarifying the purpose and legal effect of FOIA's privacy exemptions. It did
this by more clearly specifying the nature of the "personal privacy" interests
that the Act was intended to protect and by articulating a rather narrow
"public interest in disclosure" against which the privacy interest was to be
balanced.' The clarification came none too soon: as early as 1981, feder-
al agencies were overwhelmed by FOIA requests and most of the requests
came from persons who were not the Act's obviously intended beneficiaries,
and who wanted the information for purposes seemingly quite different from
those the Act had been intended to serve. 5 9
In Washington Post, the Court resolved a question that had divided the
lower courts for several years. The case concerned the meaning of FOIA
Exemption 6, which permits the withholding of "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy."" The issue that Washington Post
resolved was how to interpret the phrase "similar files." A number of courts,
including the D.C. Circuit in the case below,16 ' had interpreted the lan-
guage to apply only to those records which contain "information of the
same magnitude-as highly personal or as intimate in nature-as that at
(1993).
156 For a useful description and analysis of the law as it was in 1980, see Anthony T.
Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
727 (1980).
157 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
58 Id. at 599-602. For a useful account of the cases, see Fred H. Cate et al., The
Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: The "Central Purpose" of the Free-
dom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41 (1994).
159 Cate et al., supra note 158, at 43 (finding that by 1981, the "vast majority of the
FOIA requests were made by business executives or their lawyers who ... 'astutely
discerned the business value of the information which government obtains from industry
while performing its licensing, inspecting, regulating, and contracting functions') (foot-
note omitted).
"6o Washington Post, 456 U.S. at 595 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994)) (empha-
sis added).
161 Washington Post v. United States Dep't of State, 647 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
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stake in personnel and medical records." '162 Under this reading, the infor-
mation sought by the Washington Post-information indicating whether
certain Iranian nationals held valid U.S. passports-was subject to mandato-
ry disclosure because it was "less intimate than information normally con-
tained in personnel and medical files."'63
The Supreme Court rejected this reading of the statute. It held that Con-
gress did not intend to limit Exemption 6 to "a narrow class of files contain-
ing only a discrete kind of personal information. Rather, '[t]he exemption
[was] intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which
can be identified as applying to that individual.' ' 164 Of course, Exemption
6 does not permit nondisclosure of all individually identifiable information,
only that information the release of which would constitute a "clearly un-
warranted invasion" of a particular individual's personal privacy.
Exemption 7(C), which permits nondisclosure of records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, is similarly limited to situations in which produc-
tion "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. 1 65 Thus, important issues remained to be resolved after
Washington Post, namely, what kinds of privacy interests did FOIA's priva-
cy exemptions intend to protect from what kinds of invasions, and by what
criteria was an invasion to be judged "unwarranted."
The Court went far toward answering each of these questions in United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, 166 another unanimous decision and by far the Court's most impor-
tant pronouncement on the subject of FOIA's privacy exemptions. At issue
in Reporters Committee was whether disclosure of FBI "rap sheets" "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy"" and thus be withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(C). 68 The re-
,62 Id. at 198-99 (citing Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1980) and Board of
Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 627 F.2d 392, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1980))
(internal punctuation omitted).
163 Washington Post, 456 U.S. at 598.
" Id. at 602 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966) reprinted
in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428) (alteration in original).
165 United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 749-50 (1989).
'66 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
167 Id. at 749-50.
" Note that Exemption 7(C) is broader in permitting nondisclosure than Exemption
6, because 7(C) does not require the invasion of personal privacy to be "clearly" unwar-
ranted, and it permits nondisclosure not if disclosure would constitute a privacy inva-
sion, but merely if it "could reasonably be expected to" do so. Compare 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(6) with id. § 552(b)(7). Nevertheless, the particular 7(C) issues that the Court
addressed in Reporters Committee-the nature of the privacy interest and the nature of
the interests that would warrant invading it-are identical to the issues that an Exemp-
tion 6 case would present.
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questers argued that the events summarized in rap sheets had previously
been disclosed to the public, and that information contained in the sheets
was thus already publicly available, albeit in scattered and hard-to-obtain
form. 6 9 Accordingly, they claimed, the subjects' privacy interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of the facts contained in the rap sheets' compilation
"approache[d] zero."'7
In rejecting this argument, Justice Stevens made two important points
about the nature of the privacy interests that FOIA protected. First, informa-
tion may be classified as "private" even if, though it has once been dis-
closed, it is "'not freely available to the public."""' Rap sheets, represent-
ing "the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information,"'' 72 contain
information that is not "freely available." "Plainly there is a vast difference
between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of
courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the
country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information.' ' 73 Moreover, in various provisions of the United States
Code, including those of FOIA itself, the Court discerned a "careful and
limited pattern of authorized rap sheet disclosure,' 74 which indicated that
the sheets were restricted "'to the use of a particular person or group or
class of persons.''" In phrases certain to appeal to advocates who evince
particular concern about the privacy threat that computers pose, the Court
recognized "the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that out-
strips the combined power of the bits of information contained within.'
76
The Court even found congressional support in the Privacy Act for its con-
clusion that "a strong privacy interest inheres in the nondisclosure of com-
piled computerized information.' 77
The second important point in Justice Stevens's rejection of the
requesters' argument that the subjects' privacy interest in nondisclosure of
their rap sheets "approache[d] zero"'78 came by way of the explicit recog-
nition that there is a "privacy interest in keeping personal facts away from
the public eye." '  Justice Stevens endorsed by implication the
government's self-imposed obligation, if not its constitutional duty, to avoid
69 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764.
,70 Id. at 763.
"' Id. at 763-64 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804
(1976)).
172 Id. at 764.
173 Id.
,74 Id. at 765.
'75 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (1976)).
176 Id.
,77 Id. at 766.
,78 Id. at 763.
179 Id. at 769.
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public disclosure of information it has collected "which is personal in char-
acter and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.""18
Having thus established that subjects of FBI rap sheets had a substantial
privacy interest in the information contained therein, Justice Stevens turned
to the question of whether the invasion of privacy that rap sheet disclosure
entails would be warranted. Resolution of this question, Justice Stevens
announced, could not properly be made to turn on either the purpose for
which the request for information was made or on the identity of the re-
quester."' Instead, in passages significant for the extent to which they
tended to reduce the areas of inevitable tension between the goals of the
Privacy Act and FOIA's commands, and for narrowly limiting FOIA's dis-
closure mandates to those that serve the Act's "central purpose," Justice
Stevens held that "whether disclosure of a private document ... is warrant-
ed must turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to
the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action
to the light of public scrutiny." '182 That basic purpose is served by disclo-
sure of "[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's performance
of its statutory duties,"'83 but not "by disclosure of information about pri-
vate citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files ... that
reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct."18 4 Put somewhat
differently, "the FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information
about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Govern-
ment be so disclosed."'' 85
Finally, the Court turned its attention to the ultimate decision that was
required by FOIA to be made with respect to all the exemptions: whether
the public interest in disclosure outweighed "the interest Congress intended
the Exemption to protect."'86 In language that seemed to expand the reach
of its holding well beyond the specific facts of the case before it, the Court
held
"8o Id. at 770 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 609 (1977)).
'8, Id. at 771-72.
82 Id. at 772 (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1975))
(internal quotation omitted).
'83 Id. at 773.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 774. For commentary critical of the Court's "central purpose" test, see Eric
J. Sinrod, Blocking Access to Government Information under the New Personal Privacy
Rule, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 214 (1993); Glen Dickinson, Note, The Supreme Court's
Narrow Reading of the Public Interest Served by the Freedom of Information Act, 59 U.
CIN. L. REv. 191 (1990).
86 Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 776.
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as a categorical matter that a third party's request for law
enforcement records or information about a private citizen
can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's privacy,
and that when the request seeks no "official information"
about a Government agency, but merely records information
that the Government happens to be storing, the invasion of
privacy is "unwarranted." '87
In United States Department of State v. Ray, 8' the Court returned to
FOIA Exemption 6. The issue was whether Exemption 6 permitted deletion
of the names of individual Haitian refugees from reports, disclosed pursuant
to a FOIA request, of interviews by State Department personnel of persons
who had been involuntarily returned from the United States to Haiti.1 89
Both the requesters and the government acknowledged that the reports were
"similar files" within the meaning of Exemption 6, as interpreted by Wash-
ington Post: they "unquestionably appl[ied] to ... particular individu-
als."' 90 Therefore, resolution of the case turned on whether disclosure
would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion"' 9' of those individuals'
privacy. The Court held that it would.
First, the reports implicated a significant privacy interest because they
contained personal details, because disclosure of individual names might
lead to possible retaliation against the repatriated Haitians, and because
interviews had been conducted pursuant to promises of confidentiality. 92
Significantly, the Court thought it was not merely the disclosure of the list
and of identifying information that represented a threat to privacy. Instead,
whether disclosure of a list of names is a "significant or a
de minimis threat depends upon the characteristic(s) revealed
by virtue of being on the particular list, and the consequenc-
es likely to ensue." . . . [D]isclosure of the interviewees'
names would be a significant invasion of their privacy be-
cause it would subject them to possible embarrassment and
retaliatory action. 93
187 Id. at 780.
188 502 U.S. 164 (1991).
189 Id. at 166.
190 Id. at 173.
191 Id. at 166.
192 Id. at 165, 170, 176-77.
'9' Id. at 176 n.12 (quoting National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879
F.2d. 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks removed).
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The second reason that the invasion of privacy occasioned by disclosure of
the interviewees' names would be "clearly unwarranted" was that it would
not shed any light on the "[g]overnment's conduct of its obligation," and
thus would not serve FOIA's purpose of informing citizens as to the actions
of their government.194
The Court refused in Ray to address the question of whether other deriv-
ative public benefits that disclosure might generate would ever justify dis-
closure of information where disclosure would invade significant privacy
interests without serving FOIA's core purpose. Nevertheless, in United
States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA),'95 Justice Thomas's opinion for a unanimous Court196 squarely
held that "the only relevant 'public interest in disclosure' to be weighed in
this balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the 'core purpose
of the FOIA,' which is 'contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding
of the operations or activities of the government.""97 The case thus solidi-
fied Reporters Committee's interpretation of FOIA as containing a "core
purpose" limitation on agencies' statutory obligation to disclose information
claimed to be exempt from disclosure,198 and rendered implausible the
prospect of any future claim that derivative uses of disclosed information
would prove weighty enough to compel disclosure.
In addition to closing off the "derivative use" avenue, the Court in
FLRA resolved certain lingering tensions between the Privacy Act's prohibi-
tions on disclosure and FOIA's disclosure mandates. In FLRA, the request-
ers were the collective bargaining representatives of federal employees under
the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute (Labor Stat-
ute).' They sought disclosure of the home addresses of federal civil ser-
vice employees.2 ' The Court began its analysis of the disclosure issue
with the Labor Statute, which required the release of home addresses to
bargaining representatives unless the disclosure would be "prohibited by
law.""'' The Court's next analytical step was to hold that the employee
address records were "records" whose disclosure was prohibited by the
194 Id. at 178.
'9' 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994).
196 Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment. Id. at 1017 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment).
'9' Id. at 1012 (quoting United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 775 (1989)) (first emphasis added) (alteration in origi-
nal).
'98 Id. at 1012.
9 Id. at 1009.
200 Id. at 1008.
2"' Id. at 1011 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (empha-
sis removed).
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Privacy Act unless it was required by FOIA. °2 Finally, the Court held that
disclosure was not required by FOIA because it "would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.""0 3 While disclosure indeed
might vindicate the policies behind the Labor Statute, °" it would not fur-
ther the only interest relevant for FOIA purposes, namely, "'the citizens'
right to be informed about what their government is up to.""'20 Because
the Court found that the public interest in disclosure was practically nil, it
required only a "very slight" privacy interest to outweigh it, and the
employees' "nontrivial" privacy interest "in avoiding the influx of union-
related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits" was easily
found to be sufficiently weighty.2 6
This line of Supreme Court decisions has dissolved some of the genuine
uncertainties about how to reconcile the formal commands of the Privacy
Act and FOIA. Nevertheless, the decisions, though welcome, will not neces-
sarily have a significant impact on actual bureaucratic practice-and there's
the rub. While providing agency lawyers with legal ammunition and a co-
herent rationale with which to defend their privacy-based refusals to dis-
close, and heightening their sometimes languishing awareness of the Privacy
Act and privacy values, the decisions do not by any means guarantee a
future dependable congruence between bureaucrats' conflicting incentives: to
guard other people's privacy, or to save themselves the trouble and make it
easier to achieve their own agency's agenda. Nor do the cases make up for
the otherwise ineffectual enforcement provisions of the Privacy Act. Nor,
finally, do the cases even change the legal reality that, when the information
sought to be released by a FOIA request is not covered by the Privacy Act,
its nondisclosure is permissive, not mandatory-even if disclosure would
constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.""2 7 Because
many agencies already have taken evasive action with respect to getting
their records out from under the Privacy Act's coverage,2 8 this standard
would seem to provide a major loophole. Thus, when all is said and done,
clarifying the meaning of FOIA's privacy exemptions may have been neces-
sary to resolve the tension between privacy and access with respect to dis-
2o2 Id. at 1012.
203 Id.
204 For criticism of FLRA on grounds that it unduly undermined the congressionally-
endorsed policy in favor of collective bargaining implicit in the Labor Statute, see Mi-
chael M. Lowe, The Freedom of Information Act in 1993-1994, 43 DUKE L.J. 1282,
1294-1307 (1994).
205 FLRA, 114 S. Ct. at 1013-14 (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1988)).
206 Id. at 1015.
207 United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 166 (1991) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6) (1994)).
208 See STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 111, at 518-21.
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closure to FOIA requesters of personally identifiable information, but it was
hardly sufficient.
C. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988
In 1977, the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
instituted a program called "Project Match," subtitled "A Nationwide Pro-
gram to Expose Employees on the Federal Payroll Who Are Illegally Re-
ceiving AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) Payments."" 9
Justified as so many subsequent matching programs have been as a tool for
preventing fraud, waste, and abuse in the administration of government
benefit programs, Project Match compared state welfare rolls with lists of
federal employees in order to determine whether individuals who were
drawing government benefits were in fact eligible to receive them.2"' Pro-
ject Match was controversial both as a matter of policy and law. To answer
the legal objections, HEW prepared a formal defense of the program, partic-
ularly in terms of the project's conformity with the Privacy Act.2 1' Little
dispute arose about the technical merits of HEW's legal arguments. Still, as
one observer noted, the very fact that the Privacy Act was not an obstacle to
Project Match served as just "another reminder that the Act, for all of its
merits, does not affect substantive policy decisions about the uses of person-
al data, only the procedures to be followed once those uses are deter-
mined.2 12 Another prominent privacy advocate made an even stronger
claim about computer matching's compatibility with the underlying premises
of the Privacy Act:
Computer matching directly challenges congressional find-
ings about the need to protect personal privacy set forth in
section 2(a) of the Privacy Act, and the spirit, if not the
letter, of computer matching is directly contrary to the inten-
tions and aspirations of Congress set forth in the legislative
history of the Privacy Act. The need for privacy safeguards
holds true today with respect to the practice of computer
matching." 3
209 Langan, supra note 69, at 144.
210 Id. at 144, 148-50.
2I Id. at 148-50.
212 Id. at 150 (citing PROJECT ON PRIVACY AND DATA COLLECTION, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, THE PRIVACY REPORT 7 (1978)).
213 FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 346.
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The stated goal of Project Match itself was limited to detecting whether
federal government employees were receiving AFDC benefits,2"4 but Pro-
ject Match was merely the first of many matching programs. Indeed, in the
late seventies and early eighties, extravagant claims abounded about the
efficiencies that this "spectacularly effective technique"1 5 could achieve:
"AFDC data was soon being matched against Social Security Administration
earning records, Federal civilian and military payroll data; Veterans Admin-
istration records were being matched against supplemental security income
(SSI) files and each state's AFDC data was being matched with other
states."2 '6 Matching can be and has been used to detect "unreported in-
come, unreported assets, duplicate benefits, incorrect social security num-
bers, overpayments, incongruous entitlements (SSI checks mailed to de-
ceased individuals, mothers claiming more children than exist), present
addresses of individuals (Parent Locator Service, Student Loan Defaulters),
and providers billing twice for the same service. ' Today, according to a
recent GAO study, most computer matches are done for debt collection
purposes or to determine eligibility for government benefits. 8
Prior to the Computer Matching Act, most of the data exchanges for the
matching programs described above were justified by government officials
under the "routine use ' exception to the Privacy Act, which allows dis-
closure of data "for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for
which it was collected."20 Whatever doubts might have existed about the
integrity of the rationale, "[c]ompatibility appear[ed] to be a broad enough
standard to encompass any use which [was] not contrary to the original
purpose; thus using the information to uncover welfare cheats among the
ranks of service personnel could be labeled routine."221
Not all the computer matching that took place was at the agencies' ini-
tiative; between 1976 and 1986, Congress passed a number of statutes either
encouraging the exchange of information or specifically authorizing comput-
214 Langan, supra note 69, at 144.
215 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 50 (1986)
[hereinafter OTA, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS] (quoting OMB Deputy Director Jo-
seph Wright).
216 MADSEN, supra note 43, at 111.
237 OTA, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 215, at 39.
238 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY OF DECISIONS
AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES LITTLE AFFECTED BY 1988 ACT 10 (1993) [hereinafter
GAO, COMPUTER MATCHING].
239 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1994).
220 Id. § 552a(a)(7).
223 Langan" supra note 69, at 149.
4971995]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
er matches."' Thus, as noted by the Office of Technology Assessment in
1986, "congressional actions appear[ed] to be contradictory. 223
A general consensus began to emerge that even though few, if any,
matching programs were in technical non-compliance with either the Privacy
Act or other statutory provisions, Congress had neither addressed nor re-
solved the basic policy conflict that widespread use of computer matching
had created between the efficient management of government programs and
the rights of individuals with respect to intra- or inter-governmental disclo-
sure of personal information. The individual rights guaranteed by the Priva-
cy Act-to notice, access, and correction of records; to information that is
timely, relevant, and complete; and the prevention of information being used
without consent-seemed to be compromised by matching programs even if
they were in technical compliance. The Executive Branch had not filled the
policy breach by providing either meaningful guidelines for, or effective
oversight of, matching programs. 4 Skepticism existed in some quarters
22 Statutes implicitly authorizing computer matching are summarized in OTA, ELEC-
TRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 215, at 44-46. They include the Paperwork Re-
duction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 20 U.S.C., 44 U.S.C.); the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of
1982, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105-1106, 1108, 1113, 3512 (1988); the Debt Collection Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.); and the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.). Statutes explicitly authorizing matching are listed in OTA, ELEC-
TRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 215, at 46. They include the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.); the Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C.); the Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-249, 94 Stat. 357
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); the Food
Stamp and Commodity Distribution Amendments of 1981, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014-
2016, 2018-2020, 2023-2027, 2029, 2270 (1994); the Department of Defense Authoriza-
tion Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C.); and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
223 OTA, ELECTRONIC RECORD SYSTEMS, supra note 215, at 43.
224 See Gellman, supra note 155, at 224-25 (summarizing OMB oversight of match-
ing activity in the late 1970s and asserting that the Computer Matching Act "was passed
in part because of dissatisfaction with OMB's guidance and oversight"). David Flaherty
quotes the House Report on the Matching Act to the effect that "[g]uidance issued by
OMB has been largely ignored by agencies and unenforced by OMB. There is no mean-
ingful oversight of computer matching in the Executive Branch." FLAHERTY, supra note
28, at 357 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, COMPUTER MATCH-
ING AND PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 802, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3107, 3117).
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about whether, in fact, the benefits of all the matching programs outweighed
their costs." Furthermore, there appeared to be reason for concern about
the accuracy of the data produced by the matches, and, in particular, about
the due process rights of individuals against whom adverse action might be
taken on the basis of erroneous "hits. 226
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Act of 1988,227 which became effective on January
1, 1990. The Act does not address the most important substantive question
of what criteria ought to govern the decision to implement a particular
matching program. Also, the Act applies only to the computerized compari-
son of records for the purpose of establishing or verifying eligibility for
federal benefit programs, or recouping payments or delinquent debts under
such programs.228 The Act, however, creates procedural and administrative
barriers to the execution of future matching programs. The barriers are de-
signed, for example, to force agencies to consider the costs and benefits of
matches before undertaking them, 229 and to assure that adverse action will
not be taken against individuals unless the data adverse to them is indepen-
dently verified and they are given an opportunity to contest the data. 30
The Act requires that agencies engaging in computer matching must do
so pursuant to written matching agreements that state such things as the pur-
pose and legal authority for the match, the justification for the matching
program, its anticipated results, a description of the records to be matched,
procedures for notice to applicants, in addition to procedures for verifica-
tion, retaining, destroying, and ensuring the physical safety of records. 3
The Act further requires agencies that engage in computer matching pro-
grams to establish Data Integrity Boards to oversee matching activities, to
review and approve matching agreements, to conduct cost-benefit analyses,
and to make annual reports on matching activities.2 32 The Data Integrity
Boards do not perform a "broad privacy policy role," '33 and the Computer
Matching Act itself creates neither an enforcement mechanism nor a timeta-
225 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE COMPUTER MATCHING AND
PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 516, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15
(1988).
226 Id. at 7. A "hit" is "[iinformation on one or more data elements in two or more
automated files that appear to be identical or similar (name, Social Security number,
address, date of birth, and the like)." GAO, COMPUTER MATCHING, supra note 218, at
59.
227 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1994).
228 Id. § 552a(a)(8)(i)(I)-(II).
229 Id. § 552a(u)(4)(A).
230 Id. § 552a(p)(A)(i), (B).
23 Id. § 552a(o)(A)-(G).
232 Id. § 552a(u)(1), (3)(A)-(D).
233 Gellman, supra note 155, at 225.
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ble for compliance with its requirements. The Act's emphasis on "due pro-
cess and administrative goals" has been praised as reflecting "a shrewd
political assessment of how best to persuade Congress to act. 234
The title of the most comprehensive study of the Computer Matching
Act's operation to date, a GAO report to a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, indicates the extent of the Act's
effect. Entitled Computer Matching: Quality of Decisions and Supporting
Analyses Little Affected by 1988 Act,235 the GAO report concluded that lit-
eral compliance with the Act's mandates had not significantly enhanced the
quality of agency decisionmaking with reference to whether particular
matching programs should be undertaken. 36 Pursuant to the Act, agencies
had made some changes in their planning and in the procedures they fol-
lowed when they implemented computer matches, yet "despite these chang-
es, agencies generally were not providing full and earnest reviews of pro-
posed matches. 237 Moreover, OMB at that time had not yet issued the re-
quired guidelines and regulations "for the use of agencies in implementing"
the Act's provisions. 3 In other words, far from solving the question of
how to control substantively the way government officials use personal
information disclosed to them, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protec-
tion Act seems merely to have changed only the nature of the procedural
hoops through which bureaucrats must jump. Accordingly, the Act cannot
be said to represent a genuine institutional solution to the issue of data shar-
ing within the government.
D. A Federal Data Protection Board?
In terms of privacy as control over information, the substantive question
to ask about all forms of data sharing within the federal government is the
one so cogently expressed by prominent privacy activist David Flaherty:
"whether a person's privacy is in fact invaded in any meaningful way if his
or her record in a federal information system is simply checked along with
millions of others for compliance with a particular requirement. '239 Unfor-
tunately, Flaherty himself does not genuinely attempt to grapple with the
question. Instead, he invokes the mantra-like claim of privacy advo-
cates-the "standard fair information practice is that an invasion of privacy
certainly occurs if the data were not collected from individuals with such a
234 FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 357.
235 See GAO, COMPUTER MATCHING, supra note 218.
236 See id. at 3, 20.
237 Id. at 3.
238 Such guidelines were required by 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v)(1) (1994).
239 FLAHERTY, supra note 28, at 352.
500 [Vol. 4:2
1995] MECHANISMS FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION 501
purpose in mind."2" This claim both begs the question and rests on a
shaky normative foundation.24' Finally, as Flaherty himself acknowledges
throughout his book, the "standard fair information practice" that he de-
scribes is rarely implemented in the actual conduct of the federal
government's business.242
Indeed, the characterization of federal privacy protection as "fragmented,
discontinuous, and incomplete" is apt; and though not all commentators use
such terms, they do tend to gravitate to the same solution-the creation of a
"permanent [f]ederal agency"" vested with "overall responsibility of safe-
guarding informational privacy with respect to federal records."2" "Of the
four major privacy studies identified in the last twenty years, three recom-
mended the establishment"245 of such a permanent agency, and almost all
of the countries in the European Community have them in some form or
other.2"
The recommendation that the United States get on the bandwagon is
grounded principally in commentators' dissatisfaction with the Executive
Branch's, and especially the OMB's, weak leadership on privacy issues,
247
and in the commentators' recognition of the limitations of the Privacy Act
and the Computer Matching Act.2" A Privacy Protection Board could cure
some of these problems, so commentators claim, by bringing more visibility
to the issue of personal information collection and use, by providing a single
locus for identifying privacy problems and resolving complaints, by placing
limitations on agency collection of information, and by overseeing the quali-
ty of data in government record systems.249 "When privacy requirements
conflict with other agency goals, there is little guarantee that individual
rights will prevail absent oversight from an independent board."25" The as-
sumptions buried in this statement that must be addressed are, first, that with
240 Id. at 352-53.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
242 See generally FLAHERTY, supra note 28.
243 Robert M. Gellman, An American Privacy Protection Commission: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come ... Again, 11 Gov. INFO. Q. 245, 245 (1994).
24 Trubow, supra note 28, at 530.
245 Gellman, supra note 155, at 236.
246 For a recent, thorough account of other countries' policies, see generally
FLAHERTY, supra note 28.
247 Cf. Gary Bass & David Plocher, Strengthening Federal Information Policy: Op-
portunities and Realities at OMB, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 413, 430 (1989) ("Privacy... has
been turned inside out by OMB's shortsighted interest in easing restrictions on govern-
ment use of information about individuals.").
248 See, e.g., BERMAN & GOLDMAN, supra note 24.
249 Regan, supra note 33, at 633.
250 Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 86-87 (emphasis added).
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oversight from an independent board, individual rights will prevail and,
second and more importantly, that individual rights should prevail.
For several reasons, it seems quite unlikely that in the foreseeable future
Congress will create such an independent board or, even if one is created,
that Congress will empower it effectively to override the data management
policies of other government agencies, especially with respect to exchange
of data within the government. Define "informational privacy" as the sub-
stantive right to prevent unconsented-to use or disclosure of information.
Scrutinize the provisions of the privacy legislation that Congress has already
passed. Recognize that in fact Congress never has substantively valued
informational privacy, and certainly has not valued it more than or even as
much as government efficiency. The Privacy Act is well-nigh unenforceable,
the Computer Matching Act is both substantively toothless and severely
compromised by the several statutes that expressly authorize matching, and
FOIA would probably still be "an extraordinary piece of anti-privacy legis-
lation"'" had the Supreme Court not stepped in to fill the privacy breach.
In the face of Congress's historically weak commitment to personal privacy,
legislative proposals for establishing a Privacy Protection Board have always
had to swim upstream. Not surprisingly, such proposals have always failed,
and their present prospects seem no brighter.
Public angst about how much personal information is contained in gov-
ernment files, about how it is handled, and with whom in government it is
shared has never translated into effective political support for a powerful
institutional remedy. Apart from isolated horror stories, oft-invoked accounts
of the vastly increased potential for privacy invasions that computers' en-
hanced storage and processing capacity signify, alarming (because they
contain such big numbers) statistics referring to the immense quantities of
information in government files, and considerable evidence of rampant gov-
ernment use of personally identifiable information for different purposes
than for which it was obtained, there exists surprisingly little hard evidence
of systematic abuse by government of personal information. When specific
privacy problems become salient, specific, rather than generic, solutions are
enacted. 2 Despite the fact that these specific pieces of legislation tend to
represent the exercise by Congress of its own responsibility for actually
251 Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 776.
252 See, e.g., the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (passed in
1988 in response to disclosure by media of movies rented by Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork, the Act restricts access to consumer video cassette rental and sales infor-
mation); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994) (passed in
1978 in response to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1975), which sustained the
constitutionality of subpoena of records of deposits and checks kept by a bank pursuant
to requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, the Act establishes procedures for disclosure
of bank records to the government, and gives the depositor rights to notice and chal-
lenge).
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addressing the policy problems of what tradeoffs between privacy and other
values ought to be made, privacy advocates tend to discount these "secular"
approaches. 3 They seem to be convinced that only a "central agency" can
adequately protect privacy across-the-board, and that an across-the-board
solution is both appropriate and feasible.254 In the current deregulatory cli-
mate, however, political capital seems unlikely to be available for the cre-
ation of another layer of bureaucracy, even one with such a benign and
seemingly uncontroversial mission as that of protecting informational priva-
cy.
Nevertheless, assume for the moment that creation of a Privacy Protec-
tion Board, with broad power to monitor and control other agencies' data
collection and protection policies, were to become politically realistic. Then
the assumptions that underlie the arguments in favor of such a board would
have to be examined, and one would have to ask whether creation of such a
board would be a wise, much less a genuine, solution to an actual problem.
An attitude of complacent indifference to privacy concerns is not what
would warrant skepticism about such proposals. Rather, skepticism seems a
wholly appropriate response when one takes a hard look at the character of
the privacy issue itself, and at the intractable nature of the tension between
efficiently achieving the goals of an activist state and genuinely protecting
individuals from unconsented-to disclosures of information about them-
selves.
In the first place, no single federal agency could in reality make, much
less effectively enforce, federal privacy policy. Widespread endorsement of
generally-phrased Fair Information Practices hides the important reality that
there neither is nor ever really could be one privacy policy, at least not one
of sufficient determinacy to be of actual use in resolving actual controver-
sies. The right to control the use and dissemination of information about
oneself is not absolute; most privacy advocates recognize this fact,z" de-
spite their frequent unqualified invocations of the right.
Accordingly, the proper resolution of each privacy issue-the appropri-
ate answer to each question of whether a particular unconsented-to use
ought to be permitted-is highly context-specific. Proper resolution depends
on a multitude of variables including the purpose for which use or disclo-
sure is desired and the efficiency gains its use would generate; the extent to
which non-disclosure would permit the data subject to misrepresent herself
to the recipient agency; the purposes for which the information was original-
" See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 155, at 236.
254 Cf. Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 86-87.
" See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 295, 333-34 (1995) ("[A]ny assignment of rights to individuals must be
limited in scope. The law should not create an absolute right of control or a quasi-prop-
erty interest in one's personal data .... because of the variety of critical social inter-
ests that can support access to any individual's personal data.").
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ly collected; the kind of information at issue (whether of a highly personal,
intimate, or embarrassing nature); the subjective or objectively reasonable
expectations of the data subject with respect to its subsequent use; and the
unjustified adverse consequences that might befall the individual if the infor-
mation is used for a different purpose. In other words, not only does the
strength of the individual privacy interest vary with the context, but so does
the importance of the government interests that stand in opposition to it.
Moreover, it is not easy to develop methods for valuing the competing inter-
ests when the government has acquired the information at issue in a more or
less coercive context instead of in furtherance of a voluntary exchange, and
when the subjects of the information are not themselves parties to the inter-
or intra-governmental sharing. In the private sector, because businesses can
gain by satisfying their customers' preferences for privacy, and thus have
incentives to do so, markets can develop to measure both the demand for
privacy on the one hand, and the value of data sharing on the other. This is
not to say that the private sector is presently as responsive to customers'
privacy desires as its customers would like;256 rather, it is to note that in
the private sector genuine incentives exist to do so because market partici-
pants can appropriate the gains from getting the "privacy vs. disclosure"
calculation right. When information is in the government's hands, no such
incentives exist because government officials cannot internalize the gains
from satisfying citizens' demands for privacy. Accordingly, the possibility
that government actors will make the right trade-offs is far more remote.
One inevitable consequence of context-dependency and of the pervasive
indeterminacy of the relative values of privacy and sharing is that reasonable
people will differ about whether the proper balance has been struck in each
case, and whether privacy policy has been implemented too much or too
little. By reason of the fact that both context-dependency and value indeter-
minacy are endemic to privacy issues, a Privacy Protection Board would
inevitably find itself unable to articulate a coherent, consistent, predictable,
genuinely useful set of guidelines for resolving conflicts. Nor, because rea-
sonable people will continue to disagree, would such a board be able to
achieve consensus over time that privacy was ever being sufficiently protect-
ed.
To advocate a Privacy Protection Board is implicitly to discount the
significance of context-dependence. Worse still, it requires glossing over the
fact that privacy itself is a contested value. Citing public opinion polls and
256 Indeed, there is reason to believe that the private market for information about
consumers still has considerable room for improvement with respect to satisfying con-
sumer preferences for privacy. For description of some of the issues confronting data-
base marketers in the private sector, and suggested guidelines to improve the practices
of database marketers, see Frank V. Cespedes & H. Jeff Smith, Database Marketing:
New Rules for Policy and Practice, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1993, at 7.
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surveys,257 the writings of Privacy Protection Board proponents convey the
impression that genuine agreement exists among Americans that privacy is
not sufficiently protected, and, accordingly, that a Protection Board would
have a relatively simple task of effectuating a widely shared understanding
of how much privacy we really want.25 In fact, however, there is substan-
tial disagreement-both in the abstract and on a case-by-case basis-about
how much privacy is the right amount and about how much of other good
things we should be willing to give up for it.259
At a more mundane level, a Privacy Protection Board presents a ques-
tion about the allocation of resources and raises the issue of what would in
fact be required in the way of "oversight" to keep track effectively of the
sharing of information within government. The federal government is so
huge and sprawling, its uses of personal information so multifarious, its
records systems so massive and decentralized, its privacy practices so much
a product of particular agency cultures and agendas, that actually to oversee,
monitor, and standardize the government's information policies would be a
task of monumental, if not insuperable, difficulty. Were such a task to be
undertaken, its successful achievement would require a commitment of
political will, financial resources, and staff energy the magnitude of which is
daunting to contemplate.
Without such a huge commitment, a Privacy Protection Board might be
able to accomplish the considerably more modest task of simply making
privacy a more salient issue, of "bring[ing] more visibility to the issue of
personal information collection and use." 2" This would be perhaps a
worthwhile achievement, but it would not be an unambiguous gain. Again, it
is important to remember that the normative foundations of the claim to
informational privacy with respect to data already disclosed to the govern-
ment are far from impregnable, and that there is little empirical support for
assertions that individuals subjectively or realistically entertain expectations
that information they provide for one use will not be used for another.
257 See generally HARRIS-EQUIFAX, CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 1992, at 15 (1992)
(reporting that 78% of Americans say they are very or somewhat concerned about
threats to personal privacy as compared to 64% in 1978); HARRIS-EQUIFAX, HEALTH
INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY 1993, at 25 (1993) (reporting that 79% of American
population is very or somewhat concerned about threats to personal privacy).
258 Rotenberg, supra note 10, at 80 ("Concerns about privacy protection are widely
shared by the general public.").
" Cf Simitis, supra note 55, at 742-46 (discussing the difficulties that all countries
experience in monitoring privacy, because the task "consists not of helping government
enforce its policies but of preventing both government and private institutions from
overstepping" boundaries, and noting that "the possibility of conflict ... is ever pres-
ent").
2' Regan, supra note 33, at 633.
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Finally there is a real question as to whether privacy would be en-
hanced--or put at even greater risk-if control of personal data collection
and use were centralized in one super governmental agency. In a way, the
proposal for a Privacy Protection Board seems a little like recommending
that the fox, albeit dressed up as a benign and friendly farmer, guard the
chickens. The tyranny imagined in the Orwellian nightmare depended not
merely upon government pursuing a deliberate course of information manip-
ulation and ceaseless surveillance, but also on the centralization of all data
about everyone in one government agency. "[O]ne of the most practical of
our present safeguards of privacy is the fragmented nature of present infor-
mation .... A central data bank removes completely this safeguard. 261
The government certainly has the capacity to create a central data bank, but
nothing indicates that one exists or is even being contemplated. To the con-
trary, what presently exists are lots of uncentral data banks. So long as our
government's system of personal data protection remains "fragmented, dis-
continuous and incomplete," so will its systems of data collection, dissemi-
nation, and use. Unless the mere existence of information in government
files is an invasion of privacy, it may well be that the very diffusion of data
and data banks within the government, the diversity and decentralization of
data collection and data protection practices within the myriad federal agen-
cies are not the problem, but the solution.
26' The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on
Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1966) (statement of Rep. Frank Horton of New York).
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